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The DTSA’s Federalism Problem:
Federal Court Jurisdiction over
Trade Secrets
Conor Tucker*
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”) greatly
expanded federal protection of trade secrets. But how many trade
secrets were “federalized”? The short answer is: many, but not all.
At the heart of the DTSA lies a mammoth jurisdictional problem:
Congress only federalized certain trade secrets. Unlike copyrights
and patents, Congress has no independent constitutional basis to
regulate trade secrets. Instead, like trademarks, trade secrets are
regulated under the commerce clause and must satisfy a
jurisdictional element, which requires a nexus between interstate
commerce and trade secrets. But unlike trademarks, Congress
chose not to legislate to the fullest extent of its commerce clause
power, excluding some trade secrets from federal protection. In
short, the DTSA’s jurisdictional element ensures that only
“technical” trade secrets—i.e., formulae, manufacturing
processes, etc.—qualify for federal protection. “Business
information” secrets are protected, if at all, only under state law.
This Article is the first to explain the DTSA’s jurisdictional
element in depth and explore its practical and theoretical
implications. Interpretation of the jurisdictional element in the
DTSA is the Act’s key judicial dilemma. The jurisdictional element
imposes two requirements on a federal plaintiff’s trade secret: (1)
that the trade secret closely relates to a product or service; and (2)
that the product or service actually flows in interstate commerce.
*

Associate, Irell & Manella LLP. J.D., Northwestern University Pritzker School of
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comments, feedback, and criticism received from Professor David Schwartz, Professor
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As a practical matter, the old trade secret tort has been split in
two—with technical trade secrets federalized and business
information remaining protected solely by state law. Theoretically,
this interpretation brings trade secret policy in line with other
species of federal intellectual property policies.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 11, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”).1 By creating a federal civil
remedy for trade secret misappropriation,2 the DTSA became one
of the most important expansions of federal intellectual property
protection since the Lanham Act. 3 Before the DTSA, state law
dominated the protection of trade secrets (although federal courts
often heard trade secret cases in diversity). Because the vast
majority of states had enacted part or all of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (“UTSA”), 4 trade secret law was fairly uniform. 5
However, the Senate Report on the DTSA indicates that some
state-law differences remained case-dispositive.6 At the same time,
the cost of trade secret theft to U.S. businesses has been
approximated at between one-and-three percent of the U.S. gross
domestic product (“GDP”). 7 Congress passed the DTSA and
1

See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376.
See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)–(d) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (amending Economic Espionage Act of 1996
(EEA), 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)).
3
Notwithstanding the curious statement in the DTSA that the Act “shall not be
construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual property for purposes of any other Act of
Congress,” trade secrets in general make the most sense when viewed through the
theoretical lens of intellectual property. DTSA § 1836, 130 Stat. at 382. See Mark A.
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV.
311, 313 (2008); infra Conclusion, Section A. (discussing the theoretical foundations of
federal trade secret law). But see Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade
Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1804 (2014) (expressing doubt as to whether “there is
a normative basis for a freestanding trade secret law that is not parasitic on other
legal norms”).
4
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985).
5
Forty-seven states have codified the UTSA in some form or another. See Legislative
Fact Sheet - Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org
/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act
[https://perma.cc/4LCBFNJA] (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The EEA is the only other federal protection for trade
secret misappropriation. See EEA § 1831 (criminalizing economic espionage); id. § 1832
(criminalizing theft of trade secrets).
6
See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2–3 (2016).
7
See THE CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE (CREATE.ORG) &
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT: A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANIES TO SAFEGUARD TRADE SECRETS AND MITIGATE POTENTIAL
THREATS 9 (2014). According to a 2011 study by the Ponemon Institute, the median
annualized cost of cybercrime alone to each in a set of benchmark companies totaled $5.9
million a year. THE COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP
2
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provided a federal civil remedy to cure the ineffectiveness of the
prior federal criminal trade secret statute.8
Scholars agree that the most important question presented by
the DTSA is the interstate commerce requirement. Professor
Elizabeth Rowe has singled out jurisdictional elements, including
the interstate commerce requirement, as a key interpretive issue
still open in federal court.9 Professors Sharon Sandeen and
Christopher Seaman, in a forthcoming article canvassing four
important issues of statutory interpretation raised by the DTSA,
also single out the interstate commerce requirement as a key
issue. 10 Specifically Sandeen and Seaman identify the essential
tension between a broad and narrow interpretation of the
jurisdictional element, 11 which this Article explores in greater
detail. The jurisdictional element is at the core of interpreting the
DTSA because the scope of the entire Act turns on the scope of the
commerce power exercised by Congress.12 This Article provides a
principled look at the proper interpretation of the DTSA’s
jurisdictional element.
COMMISSION REPORT 43 (2013), http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission
_Report_052213.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3BL-LTNM].
8
See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2–3.
9
Camilla Hrdy, Major Issues in Trade Secret Law: Part 1, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
(Apr. 28, 2017, 11:21 AM), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2017/04/major-issuesin-trade-secret-law-part-1.html [https://perma.cc/TSF4-28X3] (citing Elizabeth Rowe,
Professor, Univ. of Fla., The New Era of Trade Secret Law: The DTSA and other
Developments, Remarks at Trade Secret Conference (April 21, 2017)
(transcript unavailable)).
10
Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of
Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 40) (on
file with authors).
11
Id.; see also infra Section IV.A.1.
12
While no court has explicitly construed the jurisdictional element, the two district
courts addressing the issue have come to complementary conclusions. Cf. Garfield Beach
CVS LLC v. Mollison Pharmacy, No. 17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD, 2017 WL 3605452, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017) (holding that where the question of whether the plaintiff’s trade
secrets traveled in interstate commerce is factually contested, the defendant must raise the
issue in a summary judgment motion, not a motion to dismiss); Grow Fin. Fed. Credit
Union v. GTE Fed. Credit Union, No. 8:17-cv-1239-T-30JSS, 2017 WL 3492707, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2017) (ruling that financial products sold throughout the United
States are “sufficient at this [pleading] stage to establish a nexus between the trade secrets
that were allegedly misappropriated and interstate commerce,” overcoming the
defendant’s jurisdictional objection).
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This Article suggests that, when correctly interpreted, the
DTSA’s jurisdictional element13 is narrow. More specifically, this
Article’s textual and contextual analysis of the jurisdictional
element reveals that the DTSA creates a two-tiered system for the
protection of trade secrets, relying on both state and federal
substantive law. In short, the narrowness of the jurisdictional hook
favors federal protection for technical trade secrets (formulae,
manufacturing processes, etc.), while generally relegating business
information (financials, strategies, customer information) to state
remedies. 14 Thus, the DTSA represents a cautious expansion of
federal intellectual property rights, keenly balancing the myriad
state law interests in certain trade secrets against the need
for uniformity.15
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background
on the DTSA and discusses this Article’s interpretive
methodology. Part II construes the Nexus Requirement and Part III
construes the Relationship Requirement. Part IV applies the
construction developed in this Article to hypothetical cases to test
the boundaries of the jurisdictional element. The Conclusion
briefly discusses the implications of this interpretation.
I. BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND TEXT OF THE DTSA
The DTSA is not Congress’s first foray into trade secret law. In
1996, Congress enacted the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”).16
The EEA, motivated by perceived foreign government-sponsored
corporate espionage and the lack of effective remedies under state
law,17 provided for federal prosecution of individuals who
misappropriated trade secrets.18 The EEA actually criminalized
two different types of conduct: (1) criminal corporate espionage
(i.e., stealing trade secrets from a corporation); and (2) criminal
economic espionage (i.e., stealing trade secrets for a foreign
13
14
15
16
17
18

DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61).
See infra Part III and Section IV.B.3.
See infra Conclusion.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012).
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4–6 (1996).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1832.
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nation). 19 After two decades, Congress returned to trade secret
misappropriation and passed the DTSA.20
The DTSA amends the EEA in a few critical ways. First, the
DTSA provides for a federal private civil cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation.21 Second, the private civil cause of action
includes an extraordinary new remedy: ex parte civil seizure,
which allows plaintiffs to seize defendant’s property.22 Third, the
DTSA made changes to the definitions section of the EEA.23 The
DTSA added definitions for “misappropriation” 24 and “improper
means,”25 modeling both of those definitions on the UTSA
definitions.26 The DTSA also tweaked the EEA’s initial definition
of “trade secrets” to solve a circuit split that had developed under
the EEA.27
The DTSA relied heavily on statutory language already in
place in the EEA. For instance, the bulk of the jurisdictional
element came from the EEA’s criminal economic espionage

19

Id.
See generally S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); Protecting American Trade Secrets and
Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong.
21
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)–(d) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61)
(amending EEA § 1836(b)).
22
See id. § 1836(b)(2).
23
Compare EEA § 1839, with DTSA § 1839 (adding definitions and
modifying others).
24
DTSA § 1839(5).
25
Id. § 1839(6).
26
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1)–(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979)
(amended 1985).
27
A trade secret must be secret; it must “not be[] generally known . . . [or] readily
ascertainable . . . .” Id. § 1(4). A critical question is from whom must the information be
secret? The Third and Seventh Circuits disagreed over that question under the EEA.
Compare United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating in dicta that
one could say “the public” means “the economically relevant public” (emphasis in
original)), with United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The EEA,
however, indicates that a trade secret must not be generally known to, or readily
ascertainable by, the general public, rather than simply those who can obtain economic
value from the secret’s disclosure or use.”). The DTSA substitution sides with the 7th
Circuit on this point. See DTSA, Pub. L. No. 114-153, sec. 2, § 1839, 130 Stat. 376, 380
(2016) (removing “by the public,” and substituting “another person who can obtain
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information”).
20
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provision.28 Two separate panels of the Second Circuit disagreed
over the meaning of this language in the EEA.29 These two cases
are dealt with in greater detail in Part III.30 It suffices to say here
that the confusion resulting from the Second Circuit’s conflicting
panel decisions leaves the meaning of the DTSA’s jurisdictional
element open for interpretation.
A. Statutory Text
The DTSA’s statutory text 31 and legislative history 32 clearly
create a two-tiered system of state and federal trade secret
protection. 33 Yet, the importance of this conclusion cannot be
overstated, for it presents the question of its own enforcement.
With two tiers of protection, how will “federal” and “state” trade
secrets (or trade secret rights) be defined? The jurisdictional
element answers that question because it bisects trade secret
protection into federal and state law components.
The jurisdictional element of the DTSA serves the essential
function of sifting the cases by providing federal protection for
certain trade secrets and leaving it to state law to protect other
28

Compare EEA § 1832(a) (containing the EEA corporate espionage provision prior
to the passage of the DTSA), and DTSA § 1832(a) (retaining the same provision), with
id. § 1836(b) (containing the amended civil action provision).
29
United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 264 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v.
Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2012).
30
See infra Section III.C.2.
31
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (containing the anti-preemption provision); cf. EEA
§ 1836(b) (containing the jurisdictional element); S. 1890, 114th Cong. § (2)(f) (as
reported by the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 29, 2015) (“Nothing in the amendments
made by this section shall be construed to modify the rule of construction under section
1838 of title 18, United States Code, or to preempt any other provision of law.”).
32
See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016) (“[T]his Act is not intended to alter the
balance of current trade secret law or alter specific court decisions.”).
33
That two tiers of trade secret protection now exist is so uncontroversial that it often
forms the starting-point for criticisms of the DTSA. See Christopher B. Seaman, The
Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 352–59 (2015); Letter
from Professors in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890, H.R.
3326), Eric Goldman et al., to Charles E. Grassley & Patrick J. Leahy, Chairmen, U.S.
Senate Judiciary Comm., and Robert W. Goodlatte & John Conyers, Jr., Ranking
Members, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. 6–8 (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%20Opposi
tion%20to%20DTSA%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB3T-9KGV] (noting that the
two-tiered system reduces uniformity) [hereinafter Letter from Goldman et al.].
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trade secrets: “An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated
may bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is
related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in,
interstate or foreign commerce.”34 The text of the provision makes
clear that the jurisdictional element qualifies which trade secrets, as
defined elsewhere in the statute, 35 support an action in federal
court for trade secret misappropriation. The most important part of
the jurisdictional element is that it provides a conditional cause of
action: an owner may sustain a civil action under the DTSA “if the
trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended
for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”36 This is the Qualifying
Phrase, indicating which trade secrets qualify for protection under
the DTSA.
It is important to note that the Qualifying Phrase operates to
narrow the scope of the DTSA on its own. Neither the UTSA
(which forms the model for state trade secret statutes),37 nor state
trade secret laws,38 qualify which trade secrets are actionable. The
DTSA does. The implication for statutory interpretation is that
trade secrets related to a product or service used in interstate
commerce is a sub-set of all trade secrets in the United States.
The Qualifying Phrase, in turn, consists of two requirements
for a trade secret to be actionable under the DTSA: the Nexus

34

18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (emphasis added) (amending EEA § 1836(b)).
Id. § 1839(3).
36
Id. § 1836(b)(1) (emphasis added).
37
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985)
(defining trade secret).
38
A complete catalogue of state trade secret statutes is not necessary here, but a review
of a random sample of statutes turns up no Qualifying Phrase (or similar language). See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426−3426.11(West, Westlaw through Ch. 859 of 2017 Reg.
Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-50 (2005); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1 (1988); 12 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 5301−5308 (2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002
(West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (2009). Furthermore, common law jurisdictions
do not require a connection to commerce or use in commerce or any relationship between
the trade secret and a product. See also N. Atl. Instruments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38,
40 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying New York law); Infinity Fluids Corp. v. Gen. Dynamics
Land Sys., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 294, 306−08 (D. Mass. 2016) (applying Massachusetts
law); Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. App. 1990) (governing
misappropriation in Texas occurring before September 1, 2013).
35
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Requirement and the Relationship requirement. 39 Both operate,
independently, to narrow the DTSA’s scope, and both are
structured around the “product or service.” The first is the “Nexus
Requirement,” which requires that a product or service is “used in”
“interstate commerce.” 40 The second, the “Relationship
Requirement,” requires that the trade secret is “related to” the
product or service. The primary contribution of this Article is to
demonstrate the narrowness of the Nexus and Relationship
39

A note on terminology. This Article uses the term “Relationship Requirement” to
describe the connection between the trade secret and the product or service, and the term
“Nexus Requirement” to describe the connection between the product or service and
interstate commerce. The criminal corporate espionage provision of EEA § 1832, and the
DTSA have structurally similar jurisdictional elements: both contain a first part
(concerning the connection between the trade secret and a good), and a second part
(concerning the relationship between that good and interstate commerce). Compare EEA,
Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 1832(a), 110 Stat. 3488, 3489 (1996) (setting forth the original
jurisdictional hook), with DTSA, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 1836(b)(1), 130 Stat. 37 (2016)
(amending the EEA’s jurisdictional hook). The Second Circuit—the only federal circuit
court to interpret the EEA’s initial jurisdictional element—used confusing terminology to
describe the requirements, which this Article rejects. See United States v. Agrawal, 726
F.3d 235, 244–48 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit uses the term “product
requirement” to describe the connection between the product and interstate commerce,
and the term “nexus provision” to describe the connection between the trade secret and
the product. See id. at 244–45, 247. But this is backwards. For instance, the Supreme
Court normally describes the connection between a thing or act and interstate commerce
as a “nexus.” See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000) (noting
that jurisdictional elements generally require a nexus between activity and interstate
commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–62 (1995) (noting that
jurisdictional elements generally are interpreted to require a “nexus to interstate
commerce”). Thus, it makes more sense to refer to the requirement that a product or
service flow in interstate commerce as the “Nexus Requirement” rather than the
“product requirement.”
40
For ease of analysis, the term “used in, or intended for use in” is collapsed into
“used in,” and the term “interstate or foreign commerce” is collapsed into “interstate
commerce.” The difference between the shortened and full “used in” term is simply
between current and future use in commerce. This in no way suggests that the term
“intended for use in” is undeserving of its own analysis. See, e.g., Section IV.A.2
(discussing the implications of the term “intended for use in”). The “interstate
commerce” term can similarly be collapsed for the purpose of this analysis because both
require flow of a product or service from one point (either inside a state/territory or
outside of that state/territory) to another point (either inside another state/territory or
outside of that state/territory). The critical similarity is the crossing of political
boundaries by the product or service. This combination in no way suggests that “foreign
commerce” does not warrant its own interpretation. Interstate commerce is not defined in
the EEA or the DTSA. See generally EEA §§ 1831–1839; DTSA, 130 Stat. 376.
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Requirements, 41 and explore the implications of this narrowness
for trade secret litigation under the DTSA.42
B. Contributions and Implications
This Article makes two concrete and novel contributions to
legal literature. First, it provides a principled interpretation of the
DTSA’s Qualifying Phrase and its two requirements, highlighting
the essential role played by the jurisdictional element in the new
system of trade secret protection. The interpretation offered by this
Article—guided by significant textual and contextual evidence—
indicates that both the Nexus Requirement and the Relationship
Requirement significantly narrow the breadth of the DTSA: The
value of the plaintiff’s trade secret must be directly related to the
plaintiff’s product or service, and the plaintiff’s product or service
must actually flow in interstate commerce.43 This narrow
interpretation operates to exclude certain trade secrets from
federal protection.
The implication of this interpretation is this Article’s second
contribution: a taxonomy of actionable trade secrets under the
DTSA.44 Not all trade secrets are actionable under the DTSA. The
Qualifying Phrase acts as a sieve by enabling certain federal suits
while relegating other trade secrets to state law.
From this pair of contributions arise two implications. The first
implication concerns the theoretical justification for federal trade
secrets. Under the interpretation proposed herein, trade secrets sit
snugly in the incentive-based panoply of federal intellectual
property while leaving much of its state-law based commercial
morality justification behind. The second implication concerns the
41

See infra Parts II (discussing the narrowness of the Nexus Requirement), III
(discussing the narrowness of the Relationship Requirement).
42
See infra Part IV (introducing a taxonomy of federally-actionable trade secrets).
43
See infra Sections II.E., III.D.
44
This Article takes its definition of technical trade secrets and general business
information from a pair of quantitative studies of trade secret litigation in state and
federal court. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 71–73, 98 (2010) [hereinafter Almeling
et al., State Study] (defining terms); David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of
Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 304–05, 329 (2009)
[hereinafter Almeling et al., Federal Study] (same).
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way that the jurisdictional element creates a rift with state trade
secret law, which is best seen through the concepts of “continuous
use” and “negative information.”45
Before its passage, the DTSA met significant scholarly
resistance.46 Forty-two scholars signed an open letter to Congress
in opposition to federalizing trade secrecy.47 The professors’ letter
opposed the DTSA on four grounds: (1) potential abuse of the ex
parte seizure provision;48 (2) the dangers of federalizing the trade
secret doctrine of “inevitable disclosure”; 49 (3) the anticipated
increase in cost of trade secret litigation;50 and (4) the Act’s failure
to create uniformity.51 Professor Christopher Seaman argued that
the DTSA may not even achieve its own aims—which he
identified as uniformity, providing a federal forum, fulfilling
international treaty obligations, and a national regime covering all
major intellectual property laws 52 —while causing ripples of
preemption.53 Professors David Levine and Sharon Sandeen argued
in a recent article that the expansion of protection will generate
45

See infra notes 312–18 and accompanying text.
Congress responded to some of the following concerns by modifying the DTSA. For
instance, it maintained uniformity in statutes of limitations by adopting a three-year
statute of limitation, and avoided adopting the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Compare
Letter from Eric Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 7 (noting a problem with the bill’s fiveyear statute of limitations), and id. at 5 (noting that statutory language implicitly
recognizes the inevitable disclosure doctrine), with DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(d) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-617) (amending EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012))
(showing the final enacted version adopted a three-year statute of limitations), and id.
§ 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (showing the final enacted version prohibits injunctions which
prevent entry into an employment relationship).
47
See Letter from Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 9–13.
48
See id. at 2.
49
See id. In its purest form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine allows a former
employer to bar a former employee from working within the same industry as the former
employer (or as competitors to the former employer), even absent threatened
misappropriation, if the former employer persuades the court that the employee will
“inevitably disclose” the secret. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271–72
(7th Cir. 1995). Some states have rejected this remedy as a radical restraint on employee
mobility and trade. See FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1275, 1277
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
50
See Letter from Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 2.
51
See id.
52
See Seaman, supra note 33, at 352–85.
53
See David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230, 244 (2014); Seaman, supra note 33, at 359–64.
46
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“trolling” litigation54—a phenomenon already afflicting inventive
incentives in the patent system.55 Professors Levine and Sandeen,
along with Professor Zoe Argento, argued that the solution to any
national cybercrime or cyber-espionage problem is not trade secret
protection. 56 Levine and Sandeen argued, rather, that a better
solution is the expansion and strengthening of existing provisions
governing cyber-espionage.57 Because trade secrets are tightly
woven into balances struck by states between their fiduciary and
contract law,58 federal preemption could easily upset this balance.
However, the narrow interpretation of the jurisdictional
element advanced by this article blunts much of the criticism of the
DTSA. The jurisdictional element’s narrowing could reduce the
incidence of trolling,59 control the cost of litigation,60 create greater
uniformity as to technical trade secrets—while allowing legal
diversity for the treatment of business information61—and reduce
the potential for abuse of the ex parte seizure remedy.62
54

See Levine & Sandeen, supra note 53, at 234. But see James Pooley, The Myth of the
Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act Improves the Protection of
Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1046–47 (2016).
55
See Levine & Sandeen, supra note 53, at 231.
56
See id. at 259–62; see generally Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The
Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to CyberMisappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2013–2014).
57
See Levine & Sandeen, supra note 53, at 259–62.
58
For a full discussion and examples, see infra notes 199–209 and accompanying text.
59
Plaintiffs would be required to demonstrate that the trade secret directs value to a
product or service, which would be incredibly difficult for a non-practicing entity. See
infra Section III.D.
60
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a defense under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), and may be resolved on the pleadings, thus greatly reducing the risk
of abusive and unmeritorious lawsuits.
61
Much academic resistance is centered on the inability, through non-preemption, of
the DTSA to actually bring about uniformity. See, e.g., Letter from Goldman et al., supra
note 33, at 6–8; Seaman, supra note 33, at 359–62. But federal law may preempt contrary
state law regarding technical trade secrets, thereby creating uniformity, while leaving
general business information non-preempted. See infra note 202.
62
See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61)
(containing the ex parte civil seizure provision). The ex parte civil seizure provision—
which is not available at the state law level—allows plaintiffs to seize a putative
defendant’s physical and digital material that allegedly contains trade secrets upon ex
parte application to a court. See id. Under this Article’s interpretation, it would only be
available for technical trade secrets, which are easier to define and seize than general
business information. This reduces the risk of abuse of the civil seizure provision.

14

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:1

C. Interpretive Methodology
This Article engages in statutory construction. In doing so, it
takes its statutory interpretation cues from the Supreme Court.
While the ascendency of textualism has clearly shaped the Court’s
statutory interpretation jurisprudence, the differences between
purposivism and textualism have become remarkably thin.63 The
Court, rather than explicitly adopting textualism or purposivisim,
has settled on a “middle ground” which represents an “equilibrium
that greatly tempers judicial reliance on legislative history as a
source of evidence while enhancing judicial attention to the text.”64
The Court’s recent statutory interpretation jurisprudence
indicates that this “middle ground” consists of three “buckets” of
evidence, articulated here in rough relation to the corresponding
strength of the evidence, which inform the meaning of a term: (1)
the clear meaning of the statutory text (including accumulated
meaning);65 (2) the intrinsic statutory context (statutory structure,
related phrases, case law interpreting the term, etc.);66 and (3) the
extrinsic context (legislative history, statutory purpose, impact of

Cf. Paul M. Mersino, The DTSA’s Ex Parte Seizure Order: The “Ex” Stands for
“Extraordinary” (Guest Blog Post), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/02/the-dtsas-ex-parte-seizure-order-the-exstands-for-extraordinary-guest-blog-post.htm [https://perma.cc/AL3D-JUHF] (canvasing
the granted and denied ex parte orders and finding the bar for receiving them so high as
to suggest rare success).
63
See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV 1287, 1316
(2010) [hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation]; John F. Manning, The New
Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 141–47 (2011) [hereinafter Manning, New
Purposivism]; Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 3 (2006).
64
Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 63, at 1307.
65
See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)
(Kennedy, J.) (“As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory
text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a
role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting
Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”). Modern purposivists agree.
See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011).
66
See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“So when deciding
whether the language is plain, we must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000))); see also Manning, New Purposivism, supra
note 63, at 115–16; Molot, supra note 63, at 4.
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interpretation on statutory ends, etc.).67 Importantly, judges often
utilize intrinsic context to determine the “plain meaning” of the
statutory text.68 Whether, when, and with what emphasis evidence
in each bucket is used will vary judge-to-judge and court-to-court,
and is subject to academic debate. But even textualists rely on
context to help determine meaning.69
This Article generally restricts itself to plain meaning and
intrinsic statutory context (“buckets” (1) and (2)) when discussing
construction of the Qualifying Phrase. Because of this restriction,
this Article’s interpretation of the Qualifying Phrase does not vary
whether one applies modern textualist or purposivist
methodologies. Differences at the margins of these interpretive
theories are not strictly relevant. The terms of the Nexus
Requirement have accumulated a plain meaning in the case law
interpreting jurisdictional elements.70 Disagreements about the
meaning of the Nexus Requirement are better understood as
debates concerning federalism,71 not statutory interpretation. The
Relationship Requirement, however, is unique to federal law and
has not developed a plain meaning. However, background canons
of construction and intrinsic context encourage a narrow reading of
the requirement.72 Both purposivists and textualists would utilize

67

See, e.g., Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2215 (2011) (construing “reasonable
attorney’s fees” in light of legislative purpose and judicial policy).
68
Professor Jonathan Molot posits:
Although at first glance this may seem like a meaningful distinction
[i.e., looking to context before or after deciding on a plain meaning],
upon closer analysis it is really just a matter of characterization or
spin. If two interpreters use the same interpretive tools to reach the
same interpretive result, does it really matter that one (the textualist)
purports to use context to decide on a textual meaning while the other
(the purposivist) admits that he is adjusting the text’s meaning to
reconcile it with the context?
See, e.g., Molot, supra note 63, at 4.
69
See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “[c]ontext always
matters,” including the statutory structure and use of identical terms elsewhere in the
same statute); Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 63, at 1309–10 n.101 (noting
that textualists interpret statutes in context).
70
See infra Sections II.A–E.
71
See infra Conclusion.
72
See infra Section III.A.

16

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:1

the proffered intrinsic context to define the ambiguous term
“related to.”73
II. THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT AND INTERSTATE TRADE SECRETS
The Nexus Requirement of the DTSA insists that the plaintiff’s
product or service be “used in, or intended for use in, interstate or
foreign commerce.” 74 This necessarily narrows the scope of the
DTSA. As this Part demonstrates, the terms within the Nexus
Requirement have acquired settled meanings since the 1940s, such
that courts infer that “Congress means to incorporate the
established meaning of these terms.” 75 This Part applies
established case law on congressional forbearance to the Nexus
Requirement. Congressional forbearance occurs where Congress
declines to legislate to the full breadth of its authority.76 Generally,
Congress accomplishes this end in commerce clause enactments
using certain statutory terms that have accumulated plain
meanings. For instance, the omission of the term “affecting
commerce”—or some “functional[] equivalent”—indicates that
Congress did not invoke its full commerce clause power. Because
the terms in the Nexus Requirement have a settled meaning in the
case law, the Nexus Requirement itself is clear and unambiguous:
it requires that the product or service actually flow in
interstate commerce.

73

See Molot, supra note 63, at 4. Extrinsic evidence is neither plentiful nor dispositive,
but it does point to a narrow interpretation of the term “related to.” See infra Section I.A.
Thus, to the extent that differences in the weight given to extrinsic context still exist
between textualists and purposovists, they are not dispositive.
74
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61).
75
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (citing Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 42–43 (1979)). Textualism does not require a different result. See Manning,
Second-Generation, supra note 63, at 1309–10 n.101 (“[T]extualists understand that
semantic meaning depends on the conventions that a linguistic community shares for
understanding language in context. For textualists, it includes not merely dictionary
definitions, but also colloquial meanings, the technical definitions of terms of art, and
background conventions associated with certain phrases or types of legislation.”).
Interstate commerce terms are both terms of art in the legal profession and surrounded by
a host of appropriate conventions.
76
See BORRIS I. BITTKER & BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 5.06 (2d ed. 2013).
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A. An Introduction to Congressional Forbearance
The essence of congressional forbearance is contained in the
intuition that Congress need not exercise the entirety of its
commerce power whenever it legislates under the commerce
clause.77 The Supreme Court recognizes this fact when it
distinguishes between statutes that “invok[e] Congress’ full
[commerce] power,” and statutes that employ “limiting” language
constraining the exercise of its commerce power. 78 Put simply,
Congress can employ statutory language to narrow a
statute’s reach.
At the full scope of its power, Congress can regulate purely
intrastate activities, so long as the activities are economic in
character and have, in their aggregate, a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.79 However, this describes the constitutional
scope of Congressional power. The statutory scope of a particular
commerce clause enactment is a different matter. Congress can use
statutory language to regulate to its full constitutional extent,80 or it
can forbear its full power and instead regulate only a subset of the
activity that it has the power to control.81 Congressional
forbearance is a matter of statutory construction, not constitutional
authority. Congress signals the extent of its regulation through
jurisdictional elements and definitions of the term “interstate
commerce” in statutes. 82 Activities that lie within the ambit of
Congress’s constitutional commerce power may, in fact, fall
outside the statute’s language.
Three principal considerations determine the scope of a statute
under its jurisdictional element. The first is the presence or absence
77

See id.
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 856–57 (2000).
79
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (2015). See generally, e.g., King
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
80
See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570 (1943) (“Congress did not
exercise in this Act the full scope of the commerce power.” (emphasis added)).
81
See, e.g., McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1982); United States v.
Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 282–83 (1975).
82
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (invoking a narrower definition of “interstate
commerce” requiring the crossing of state lines in title 18—i.e., “commerce between one
State . . . and another State . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012) (exerting the full
extent of congressional power over “[e]stablishments affecting interstate commerce”).
78
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of the term “affecting . . . commerce.”83 The second is that other
statutory terms may operate as the “functional equivalent” of the
term “affecting . . . commerce.” 84 Functionally equivalent
language, despite omitting the term “affecting . . . commerce,”
generally invokes the full breadth of congressional commerce
power.85 The third consideration is explicit limiting language, such
as the term “used in.” Limiting language, when included in a
statute, indicates a narrowed exercise of congressional
commerce power.86
B. Omission of the Term “Affecting . . . Commerce”
Congress invokes its full commerce clause power by including
the term “affecting . . . commerce” in the statutory text. 87 The
term’s significance and meaning has, as the cases below indicate,
become so clear that its absence implies that Congress meant to
exercise something less than the full extent of its power. Two cases
illustrate how the omission of the term “affecting . . . commerce”
narrows the scope of statutes.
The first case involves the Clayton Antitrust Act, an
amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act. In 1975, section 7 of the
Clayton Act read as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall
acquire . . . the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital . . . of another corporation also
engaged in commerce . . . [where] the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.88
In United States v. American Building Maintenance
Industries, 89 prosecutors sought to enforce this section against
American Building Maintenance Industries (ABMI), “one of the
83

See, e.g., Walling, 317 U.S. at 570.
See infra Section II.D.
85
See infra Section II.D.
86
See infra Section II.C.
87
See Walling, 317 U.S. at 570.
88
United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275 (1975)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1975)).
89
422 U.S. 271.
84
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largest suppliers of janitorial services in the country,” over the
acquisition of two southern California janitorial firms. 90 ABMI
was “unquestion[ably]” involved in interstate commerce. 91 At
issue, however, was whether the two acquired companies were
“engaged in commerce” within the meaning of the Clayton Act.92
This required the Court to construe the term “in commerce,” which
the government argued should be defined as co-extensive with
congressional power over commerce.93 In support of this argument,
the government cited legislative history, 94 and purported
similarities to the Sherman Act (which reached the fullest extent of
congressional power).95
The Court disagreed and construed the term as a limited
exercise of congressional commerce power.96 The term “in
commerce” captured only those entities, persons, or things that
“engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, and was not intended
to reach all corporations engaged in activities subject to the federal
commerce power.” 97 The Court reached this conclusion for the
following reasons. First, the Court had previously construed the
term “in commerce” to be a narrow exercise of congressional
power. 98 Second, contrary to the government’s contention, the
differences—and not the similarities—between the Clayton and
Sherman Acts were dispositive.99 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving
Co.,100 the Court decided that section 1 of the Clayton Act, which
defined commerce as “trade or commerce among the several
states,” differed markedly from section 1 of the Sherman Act, in
which the definition of commerce was “keyed directly to effects on
interstate markets.”101 Thus, while Congress intended to “go to the

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 273–74.
Id. at 274–75.
See id. at 275.
See id. at 277–78.
See id. at 277.
See id. at 278.
See id. at 283.
Id.
Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1974)).
See id. at 283–86.
419 U.S. at 194.
Id.
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utmost extent of its Constitutional power” in the Sherman Act,102
Congress intended to exercise only part of its commerce power in
the Clayton Act. 103 Third, the ABMI Court reasoned that when
Congress re-enacted the Clayton Act in 1950, Congress was well
aware that “the phrase ‘engaged in commerce’ had long since
become a term of art, indicating a limited assertion of federal
jurisdiction.” 104 Fourth, the agencies tasked with enforcing the
statute understood it to apply only to firms “clearly engaged in the
flow of interstate commerce.”105
By using the term “in commerce” instead of “affecting
commerce,” Congress limited its commerce power to specifically
regulate only those entities engaged in the flow of commerce.106
Since the two acquired companies had no clients out of state, rarely
communicated out of state, and sourced labor and supplies entirely
in-state,107 they were not engaged “in commerce” within the
meaning of the statute.108
In the second case, United States v. Wright,109 the defendant
appealed his conviction for interstate transportation of child

102

Id. (quoting United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n., 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944),
superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as recognized
in Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)).
103
Id. at 195. The full quote demonstrates the Court’s conviction that the term “in
commerce” did not reach as far as the term “affecting commerce”:
In contrast to [section 1 of the Sherman Act], the distinct ‘in
commerce’ language of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act
provisions with which we are concerned here appears to denote only
persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce—the
practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services
for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the
consumer. If this is so, the jurisdictional requirements of these
provisions cannot be satisfied merely by showing that allegedly
anticompetitive acquisitions and activities affect commerce.
Id. (emphasis in original).
104
Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. at 279–80.
105
See id. at 281–82.
106
See Gulf Oil, 419 U.S. at 194 (citation omitted).
107
Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. at 273–74.
108
See id. at 285–86.
109
625 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010), superseded by statute, Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997), as recognized in
United States v. Barragan, 871 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2017).
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pornography. 110 At the time of the defendant’s conviction, the
statute made it illegal to “knowingly mail[] or transport[] or ship[]
in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer, any child pornography.”111 The parties agreed that no
proof was presented at trial that the images had crossed state
lines.112 However, the government sought an interpretation of
“in . . . commerce” that did “not require actual transportation . . .
across state lines.” 113 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
government’s interpretation.114
The underlying statute had, contrary to the government’s
reading, a jurisdictional element115 that required the government to
present evidence that the images moved in interstate commerce.116
The Ninth Circuit reached this decision for three reasons. First, the
court found that the plain meaning of the statute “seems to require
at least some method of interstate travel.”117 Second, authorities in
other circuits that interpreted similar statutory language from
different statutes required actual transportation in interstate
commerce, and cautioned toward construing the provision
narrowly.118 Both of these reasons centered on the term
“transport[].” However, the final reason concerned the scope of the
statute which, at the time of conviction, lacked terms designed to
invoke the full exercise of congressional power. 119 Indeed, the
court noted a plethora of instances where Congress sought to
constrain its power, and leave regulation of intrastate activities to
the states. 120 Furthermore, legislative history indicates that
110

See id. at 588. The defendant maintained throughout trial that his roommate, who
disappeared during the investigation, used the defendant’s computer to store the images.
See id. at 589.
111
Id. at 590 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2000)).
112
See id. In fact, the undercover agent who had downloaded the files in question was
also within the defendant’s state. See id.
113
Id. at 590–91.
114
See id. at 600–01.
115
Id. at 591 (referring to the jurisdictional element as a “jurisdictional hook,” which is
generally interchangeable with the term “jurisdictional element”).
116
Id. at 594.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 591–92.
119
See id. at 592–93 (pointing to terms like “affecting commerce” or “involving
commerce” focused on by other circuits).
120
See id.

22

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:1

Congress desired to leave intrastate crimes entirely to the state.121
The judgement was thus reversed.122
These cases demonstrate that the absence of the “affecting . . .
commerce” term clearly indicates that Congress exercised less than
its full authority under the commerce clause. By forbearing part of
its regulatory authority, Congress can intentionally leave activity
for the states to regulate, such as it did in Wright.123
The Nexus Requirement omits “affecting . . . commerce.” 124
Instead, the DTSA states that a product or service must be “used
in . . . interstate commerce.”125 Congress has been on notice since
the 1940s that omitting the term “affecting . . . commerce” implies
the scope of the statute is less than the constitutional maximum.126
Because omitting this term of art is well understood to have that
consequence, courts must infer that “Congress means to
incorporate th[at] established meaning,”127 and therefore, does not
reach the full extent of Congress’s commerce clause powers.
Examining the Nexus Requirement in comparison with ABMI
and Wright confirms this reading. For instance, like ABMI, where
the re-enacted Clayton Act term “had long since become a term of
art indicating a limited assertion of federal jurisdiction,”128
Congress knew that omitting the term “affecting . . . commerce”
from the EEA and the DTSA indicated a limited scope of its
commerce power. Furthermore, Congress changed the statutes at
issue in ABMI and Wright to expand their reach by adding the term

121

See id. at 592 n.7.
Id. at 601.
123
Cf. id. at 598 (quoting a Department of Justice writing to suggest Congress strike the
words “affect interstate commerce” from the initial bill, specifically stating “[i]n our
opinion [the Department of Justice], the investigation or prosecution of purely local acts
of child abuse should be left to local authorities with federal involvement confined to
those instances in which the mails or facilities of interstate commerce are
actually used . . . .”).
124
See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61).
125
Id.
126
See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570 (1943) (indicating that the
absence of the word “affecting” indicates Congress invoked less than their full authority).
127
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981).
128
United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 280 (1975).
122
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“affecting . . . commerce.” 129 However, when Congress amended
the EEA in 2012 and enacted the DTSA in 2016, they omitted the
term “affecting . . . commerce”,130 yet the new language contains
the “identical” omission of the term “affecting . . . commerce.”131
Furthermore, the ABMI Court found it informative to compare
the jurisdictional elements in similar statutes.132 Recall that in
ABMI the Court reasoned that the Sherman Act’s inclusion of the
term “affecting . . . commerce” indicated that the Clayton Act’s
omission of the same term reflected Congress’ intent that the
statute be interpreted more narrowly.133 The most natural
comparator for the DTSA is the Lanham Act, another federal
intellectual property statute enacted under the commerce clause.134
The Lanham Act governs and protects Trademarks “in
commerce,”135 and is superficially similar to the DTSA because it
lacks the term “affecting commerce.” The similarity is only
superficial because the Lanham Act further defines “commerce” as
“all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,”136
effectively expanding its scope to the full extent of congressional
power, such that even de minimis use in commerce is covered.137
By contrast, the DTSA does not contain a definition of

129

See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122
Stat. 4001, 4003 (2008) (expanding the jurisdictional element at issue in Wright);
Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, sec. 6, § 18, 94 Stat.
1154, 1158 (expanding the scope of the Clayton Act in light of American Building
Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271).
130
See Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, sec. 2,
§ 1832(a), 126 Stat. 1627 (amending the jurisdictional nexus in light of Aleynikov to its
current formulation, “used in, or intended for use in” interstate commerce).
131
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 6, 8–9 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 104-788,
at 4, 8–9 (1996).
132
Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. at 278 (comparing the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1975), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 18 (1975)).
133
See supra notes 97–105 and accompanying text.
134
Both the DTSA and the Lanham Act must be enacted under the Commerce Clause
because the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the U.S. Constitution only empowers
Congress to regulate patents and copyrights. Cf. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82, 91 (1879).
135
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
136
Id. § 1127.
137
See Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 992–94 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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“commerce” or “interstate commerce.”138 Moreover title 18
contains a definition of “interstate commerce,” that explicitly
contemplates movement across state lines (i.e., the flow of
commerce),
rather
than
any
activity
that
merely
affects commerce.139
The Lanham Act provided Congress with a model for enacting
an intellectual property statute under the commerce clause. But
Congress did not follow that model in a significant respect:
Congress decided to omit the term “affecting . . . commerce,” and
declined to define interstate commerce in either the EEA or the
DTSA.140 Just as the difference between the scope of the Sherman
Act and Clayton Act indicated that Congress exercised only a
portion of its commerce power under the Clayton Act, so too does
the difference between the Lanham Act and the DTSA demonstrate
Congress’s intent to forbear part of its commerce power.
C. Limiting Terms and Other Indicia of a Narrow Nexus
The scope of a statute is determined by the extent to which
Congress exercised its commerce power—it is exercised in full
where the term “affecting . . . commerce” is employed or, possibly,
a functionally equivalent term.141 In the absence of such language,
as will be seen, the scope of the statute is determined through
reference to other indicia of congressional intent. The Supreme
Court, as explained below, has indicated that other statutory
language may define the scope of a statute.
This is the case with ABMI and Wright, discussed above.
There, the absence of the term “affecting . . . commerce” was
instructive, but not wholly dispositive of the question of the scope
of the statute. 142 Other indicia of a limited exercise of
congressional authority was instructive, such as in ABMI where the
Court compared the jurisdictional element of the Clayton Act to
138

18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (expanding the
definition section of the EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)).
139
See 18 U.S.C. § 10; McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 648–55 (1982)
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 10).
140
See supra text accompanying notes 138–39.
141
See supra Section II.B.
142
See supra Section II.B.
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another statute regulating competition, namely, the Sherman
Act.143 In Wright, the Ninth Circuit noted the slow and deliberate
expansion of congressional power into the realm of state
regulation, which counseled in favor of narrowly interpreting the
statutory language.144
In other cases, the Court has relied on limiting terms within the
jurisdictional element itself to infer a limited exercise of
congressional power. Specifically, the term “used in” has been
considered to limit the exercise of congressional authority under
the commerce clause, as the Supreme Court held in Jones v. United
States.145 The Court reached this decision even though the phrase
appeared in conjunction with the term “affecting commerce.”146 At
issue in Jones was the federal statute outlawing arson.147 In
pertinent part, the statute criminalizes “damag[ing] . . . by means
of fire . . . any building . . . used in interstate or foreign commerce
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”148 The
defendant had been convicted of arson after allegedly throwing a
Molotov cocktail into his cousin’s house. 149 The question was
whether Congress had criminalized this conduct. 150 The
government argued for an expansive definition of “used in”: the
house was “used . . . in an activity affecting interstate commerce”
because the owner had a mortgage (the home was “used” to secure
a loan), the owner obtained insurance from an out-of-state firm,
and the gas for the home came from out of state.151
But the Court rejected the government’s expansive view. 152
Instead, the qualifying words “used in” indicated a constrained
exercise of the commerce power.153 This was so even though the
statute includes the term “affecting . . . commerce”—which
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
See 529 U.S. 848, 850–51 (2000).
Id. at 855–56.
See id. at 852.
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2012)
See Jones, 529 U.S. at 851.
See id. at 852.
Id. at 855.
See id. at 859.
See id. at 854.
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normally “signal[s] Congress’ intent to invoke its full authority
under the Commerce Clause.”154 The phrase, “used in,” the Court
held, limits the buildings regulated by the statute to those in “active
employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive,
passing, or past connection to commerce.”155 Because the house in
question was not actively used for a commercial purpose, it fell
outside the statute’s scope.156
The Court’s interpretation of the statute was heavily influenced
by the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.157 A more expansive
definition of the term “used in” would have implicated “grave and
doubtful constitutional questions,” and the Court generally
construes statutes to avoid such questions. 158 Thus, absent such
constitutional concerns, the Court may have been willing to give
the term “used in . . . an activity affecting commerce” a more
expansive definition. Be that as it may, Jones indicates that the
presence of statutory terms such as “used in” operates to restrict
the scope of the underlying statute.
There are two indicia that the Nexus Requirement is narrow.
The first is the term “used in,” and the second is the title-wide
definition of interstate commerce.
First, the Nexus Requirement incorporates the term “used in”
to modify the requisite connection between the product or service
and interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has held that the
term “used in,” when incorporated into a jurisdictional hook,
requires actual use in interstate commerce,159 or in other words, the
“used in” term signals that the products or services must be in the
flow of interstate commerce.160 Indeed, both Second Circuit panels
154

Id.
Id. at 855.
156
See id. at 859.
157
See id. at 857–58.
158
Id. at 857 (citing United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
159
See, e.g., id. at 855.
160
See United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276 (1975) (“The
distinct ‘in commerce’ language . . . ‘appears to denote only persons or activities within
the flow of interstate commerce—the practical, economic continuity in the generation of
goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the
consumer.’” (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974))).
155
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interpreted the term “used in” in the context of the EEA, finding
that it required actual flow of the product—or intended flow of the
product—across state lines.161
Second, title 18 includes a narrow definition of the term
“interstate commerce,” which “includes commerce between one
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and
another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of
Columbia.”162 On its face, this provision contemplates movement
from one state across political borders to another state. Courts have
recognized that this definition requires “passing to and fro” across
political borders in the flow of interstate commerce.163 This is in
marked contrast to blanket definitions in other statutes, which
extend well beyond the flow of commerce across borders to reach
entirely intrastate activities.164 Indeed, even within title 18, when
Congress intends to provide for a more expansive exercise of its
commerce power, it specifically includes the word “affecting” in
the statute.165
161

See United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 245 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that
products must be introduced into the “stream” of commerce); United States v. Aleynikov,
676 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a trade secret that affects commerce but was
not in the stream of commerce did not support prosecution under the EEA).
162
See 18 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
163
Londos v. United States, 240 F.2d 1, 6 (5th Cir. 1957); see, e.g., McElroy v. United
States, 455 U.S. 642, 648–56 (1982) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 10 contemplates items
crossing state lines, but is “not limited to unlawful activities that occur while crossing
state borders,” and therefore reaches activities “at any and all times during the course of
its movement in interstate commerce”); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114
(9th Cir. 2006).
164
See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The word ‘commerce’ . . . [is] all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”); 21 U.S.C. § 1033(c) (2012)
(“The term ‘commerce’ means interstate, foreign, or intrastate commerce . . . .”); see also
29 U.S.C. § 630(h) (2012) (supplementing the definition of commerce with a definition
of “industry affecting commerce” as “any activity, business, or industry in commerce or
in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of
commerce”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (2012) (same).
165
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (making it illegal for a felon to “transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition” (emphasis added)); id. § 24 (defining “health care benefit program” as “any
public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical
benefit . . . is provided to any individual” (emphasis added)); id. § 175b(a)(1) (“No
restricted person shall ship or transport in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, any biological agent or toxin . . . .”
(emphasis added)).

28

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:1

D. Functional Equivalency
The Supreme Court has, in one instance, indicated that another
statutory term may serve as the functional equivalent of
“affecting . . . commerce.” Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) allows for the enforceability of mandatory arbitration
terms contained in “a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.”166 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v.
Dobson,167 the Supreme Court considered whether a contract
contemplating primarily local activities was included in this
definition, despite the absence of the term “affecting
commerce.”168 The Supreme Court held that the statute exercised
“Congress’ commerce power to the full” extent, and therefore
reached local contracts.169 The Court was persuaded that the phrase
“involving commerce” was the “functional equivalent” of the term
“affecting commerce.” 170 The Court cited the similarity between
the dictionary definitions of “involve” and “affect,”171 as well as
congressional intent to exercise its full power,172 and the frustration
of the statute’s purpose without a broad interpretation of the term
“involving commerce.”173
As a preliminary matter, the functional equivalency doctrine
has not been applied to interstate commerce outside of the FAA.
As both parties in Allied-Bruce admitted, such a term is unique in
the U.S. Code.174 Although Allied-Bruce has not been overruled,175
its application of the functional equivalency doctrine may be
limited to the term “involving commerce.” Furthermore, AlliedBruce’s interpretive methodology has been largely eclipsed in the

166

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
513 U.S. 265 (1995).
168
See id. at 269–70.
169
Id. at 277.
170
Id. at 273–74, 277.
171
See id. at 274.
172
See id. at 279.
173
See id. at 275.
174
See id. at 273.
175
Although the Court decided Allied-Bruce before Lopez and Morrison, the Court has
held that Lopez does not affect the functional equivalency doctrine. See Citizens Bank
v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 58 (2003).
167
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two decades since it was decided.176 Thus, arguments to apply the
functional equivalency doctrine beyond the FAA may no longer
rest on solid foundations.
Even if the functional equivalency doctrine applies outside the
context of the FAA, it does not apply to the DTSA. The Nexus
Requirement has no term that can be construed as functionally
equivalent to “affecting . . . commerce.”177 The Qualifying Phrase,
as a whole, contains no functionally equivalent term either.178 The
term “related to”—in fact, the entire Relationship Requirement—
cannot serve as functionally equivalent because it performs a
separate function within the jurisdictional element by defining the
proximate connection between the product or service and the trade
secret.179 In the DTSA, “related to” modifies “product or service,”
not “commerce”;180 whereas in Allied-Bruce, the functionally
equivalent term directly modified “commerce.”181 Interpreting
“related to” as functionally equivalent stretches the Qualifying
Phrase past its grammatical breaking point. Word choice and word
placement matter in statutory interpretation. There is a meaningful
difference between “dogs prohibited” (a narrow rule), and
“dangerous animals prohibited” (a broader standard), which is
directly related to the words used in the legislation.182 Only where
176

Justice Breyer’s first source of authority when interpreting the FAA in Allied-Bruce
was the “basic purpose” of the law. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 270. The
Court’s emerging consensus around text-centered purposivism may have deeply
undermined Breyer’s interpretive methodology in Allied-Bruce Terminix. See supra notes
63–67 and accompanying text.
177
See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61).
178
See id.
179
See infra Part III.
180
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1).
181
See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 274. Compare DTSA § 1836(b)(1)
(“[R]elated to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign
commerce.”), with 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“[A] contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.”).
182
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 89–90 (1984); see also Manning, New Purposivism, supra
note 63, at 116:
On this account [the ‘new purpovisim’ of the Court], even if one
believes that law is inescapably purposive and that interpreters should
interpret a statute to fulfill its purpose, an interpreter must take
seriously the signals that Congress sends through the level of
generality reflected in its choice of words.
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the term relates to the nexus between the trade secret, product or
service, and interstate commerce, can the term serve as the
functional equivalent of “affecting.” In other words, if the term
serves a separate function within the statute, it cannot be
functionally equivalent to “affecting.” Thus, there is no
functional equivalent.
E. Interpreting the Nexus Requirement
As the prior sections demonstrate, the terms of the Nexus
Requirement should be narrowly construed to require the identified
product or service to actually flow in interstate commerce, or be
intended to actually flow in interstate commerce. However,
because it is well-established that Congress can regulate such
products or services at any point along the stream of commerce,183
the Nexus Requirement at its broadest may not be much narrower
than the full exercise of Congress’s commerce power. 184 But, it
removes from the scope of the DTSA purely intrastate products or
services, as well as products or services that affect interstate
commerce only.
III. NARROWNESS OF THE RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT
The term “related to a product or service” is entirely unique in
the U.S. Code.185 Thus, unlike the Nexus Requirement, the terms
of the Relationship Requirement have accumulated no plain
meaning. This Part argues that the Relationship Requirement
should be construed narrowly. As discussed below, statutory
context and background principles of the law suggest that the
Relationship Requirement insists on a close, discernable, and direct
relationship—rather than a passing, possible, or indirect
relationship—between the trade secret and the product or service.

183

See McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 648–56 (1982).
See, e.g., Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After
Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional Element Loophole, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1704–06 (2002).
185
The phrase only appears in the EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012), and
DTSA § 1836(b)(1).
184
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To discern the meaning of the Relationship Requirement, this
Part proceeds in five sections. The first, Section III.A, discusses
background principles of law, starting with the (rather unhelpful)
dictionary definition of “related.” Not only is it ambiguous, but the
definition—read at its broadest—contradicts other terms in the
statute. The second, Section III.B, discusses how the statutory
context of the Relationship Requirement independently supports a
narrow reading of the term “related to.” A narrow reading is
suggested by the economic espionage provision of the EEA and the
anti-preemption provision of the DTSA. Section III.C discusses
how the parallel term “related to” in the EEA has—with one
notable exception—been narrowly interpreted to require a close
relationship between the trade secret and product or service. The
fourth, Section III.D, proposes a test to determine whether a trade
secret is sufficiently “related to” a product or service. Finally,
Section III.E concludes by exploring and rejecting an alternative,
broader, interpretation of the Relationship Requirement.
A. Background Principles Require a Narrow Relationship
Requirement
This Section discusses two background principles of statutory
interpretation. The first is the principle that the plain meaning of an
unambiguous term governs. The dictionary definition of “related
to” does not clarify the meaning of the term. Instead, both
definitions raise the same question: how closely must the trade
secret be related to or connected to the product or service? The
second background principle applied by this Section is that courts
should not construe provisions to read terms out of a statute.
Guided by this insight, this Section returns to the plain meaning of
the
term,
which—as
revealed
by
its
context—is
necessarily narrow.
The starting-point for any interpretation of statutory terms is
the text itself. In King v. Burwell, the Court interpreted the plain
meaning of the term “established by the State” in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly referred to as the
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“ACA” or “Obamacare”). 186 The Court discussed how to
determine plain meaning:
If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it
according to its terms. But oftentimes the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or
phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’ So when deciding whether the language is
plain, we must read the words ‘in their context and
with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.’ Our duty, after all, is to ‘construe statutes,
not isolated provisions.’187
The conundrum identified by the Court in King and in the quote
above, is that words may have one meaning when read in isolation,
but have another meaning when they are read in their
proper context.
In isolation, the term “related to” can be quite broad. The
American Heritage Dictionary defines “related” as “[c]onnected;
associated.” 188 The term—and its equivalents “connected” and
“associated”—at their maximal breadth encompass any relation,
connection, or association. But, the Supreme Court has
admonished courts that “construing statutory language is not
merely an exercise in ascertaining ‘the outer limits of [a word’s]
definitional possibilities.’”189 Instead, “[i]interpretation of a word
or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text,” which
may “require a narrower reading” than the “definition of words
in isolation.”190
186

135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (examining the validity of 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2010),
as it pertains to section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code).
187
Id. (first quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010);
then quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000);
and then quoting Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010)).
188
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1043 (2d College ed. 1982); see also Related,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/related [https://perma
.cc/VG39-7V49] (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (“[C]onnected by reason of an established or
discoverable relation.”).
189
See FCC v. AT&T, Inc. 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011) (alteration in original)
(quoting Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)).
190
Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486.
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When read in its statutory context, the Relationship
Requirement is narrow. The Qualifying Phrase itself indicates that
the civil remedy is available only for certain trade secrets: i.e., “if
the trade secret is related to a product or service.”191 The
Qualifying Phrase itself exists to identify which trade secrets have
protection under the DTSA. Allowing a suit if the trade secret has
any relation to a product or service would allow for
misappropriation suits over all trade secrets. Since the Qualifying
Phrase clearly narrows the scope of actionable misappropriation, a
broad reading of the term “related to” would read the Qualifying
Phrase out of the statute.192 If Congress had wanted that result, it
should have placed a period where the Qualifying phrase belongs,
like so: “An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may
bring a civil action under this subsection[.]”193 There is a strong
background presumption in statutory interpretation that courts
should not construe provisions to read terms out of the statute.194
Applying that presumption undermines a broad reading of the term
“related to.”
Instead, the term “product or service” anchors the trade secret
at issue to the statute. The weaker the relationship, the weaker the
anchor. A narrow interpretation of the term avoids reading the
Qualifying Phrase out of the statute, and ensures that the trade
secret is sufficiently connected to the product or service to warrant
federal protection. In that way, the Qualifying Phrase serves to
identify which trade secrets support an action for misappropriation.
As the next section demonstrates, plenty of evidence in the broader
statutory context supports this conclusion.

191

DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61)
(emphasis added).
192
See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (2016)
(“[O]ur constitutional structure does not permit this Court to ‘rewrite the statute that
Congress has enacted.’” (quoting Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005)));
United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 193 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting “the general principle
that we should avoid interpretations that effectively read words out of a statute”).
193
DTSA § 1836(b)(1).
194
See supra note 192.

34

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:1

B. Intrinsic Statutory Context Suggests a Narrow Relationship
Requirement
The conclusion reached in the prior section—that the
Relationship Requirement must be read narrowly—is supported by
federal trade secret provisions outside the Qualifying Phrase. This
Section discusses two such provisions: the economic espionage
provision of the EEA, and the anti-preemption provision of
the DTSA.
First, a narrow construction of the Relationship Requirement is
suggested by comparing the Relationship Requirement to the
economic espionage provision of the EEA, one of two federal trade
secret crimes (the other is criminal corporate espionage). The
EEA’s economic espionage provision makes it a crime to “steal[],
or without authorization appropriate[], take[], carr[y] away, or
conceal[], or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtain[] a trade
secret.” 195 Notably, this provision has no Qualifying Phrase; the
only other requirements are an intent to benefit a foreign
government and knowledge that the trade secret is a trade secret.196
Thus, any trade secret—without qualification—supports
prosecution under the economic espionage provision. On the other
hand, the Qualifying Phrase appears in both the corporate
espionage provision of the EEA (the other criminal provision)197
and the DTSA.198 This clearly implies that the DTSA’s Qualifying
Phrase narrows which trade secrets support an action for
misappropriation: under the economic espionage provision of the
EEA, any trade secrets support prosecution; under the DTSA, only
sufficiently related trade secrets support civil action.
Second, a narrow construction of the Relationship Requirement
is necessary to make sense of the DTSA’s anti-preemption
provision, which makes clear that the federal act does not preempt
state remedies for trade secret misappropriation.199 The anti195

18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1) (2012).
Id. § 1831(a) (“Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense shall benefit any
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly . . . .”).
197
See id. § 1832(a) (showing that, other than the Qualifying Phrase, section 1832 is
identical to section 1831).
198
DTSA § 1836(b)(1) (amending EEA § 1836(b)).
199
Id. § 1838.
196
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preemption provision creates a two-tiered system of state and
federal trade secret protection. However, nearly all of the state
trade secret statutes and the DTSA are based on the UTSA. 200
Given that differences among states remain dispositive,201 there is
a great likelihood that federal trade secret law will create a
preemption issue if both the state and federal laws cover identical
subject matter.202
An example will help explain. The DTSA indicates that
misappropriation occurs, inter alia, if the disclosure is made in
violation of a “duty to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret.”203
In state trade secret cases, this duty generally arises under
contract.204 Contractual non-disclosure agreements are likely to be
interpreted under state law.205 But state laws vary considerably on
the question of whether a contract defines the full extent of the
200

S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016, S. REP. NO.
114-220, at 2.
201
Id.
202
The DTSA presents a particularly pernicious preemption issue because, while it
includes an express anti-preemption section (also called a “savings clause”), federal law
may end up directly conflicting with state law on a host of issues. This Article does not
deal directly with the preemption issue, but suggests that a narrow jurisdictional element
minimizes this problem. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9
(2003) (finding that complete preemption only occurs where a federal statute provides the
“exclusive” cause of action); Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 702–03 (4th
Cir. 2015) (finding that where federal law is not the exclusive remedy, preemption is not
complete); DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030–31
(E.D. Wis. 2008) (finding congressional intent in the Fair Labor Standards Act context,
expressed through savings clause, to not preempt state law limits preemption to
direct conflict).
203
18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(II) (amending EEA § 1839); see also id.
§ 1839(5)(B)(ii)(III) (“[D]erived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret . . . .”); id. § 1839(6)(A) (stating
the term “improper means” includes “breach of a duty to maintain secrecy”).
204
See, e.g., ELIZABETH ROWE & SHARON SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE
SECRET LAW 279 (2d ed. 2017) (indicating that the duty of confidentiality arises from two
general sources: contract and common law).
205
This Article assumes, for argument, that contractual terms at issue in trade secret
cases will be interpreted under state law. This balance has been previously struck in
patent law concerning assignments that interpret their validity under state law and the
ability to assign patents under the Patent Act. See Abbot Point of Care, Inc. v. Epocal,
Inc., 666 F.3d 1299, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“This court also reviews contract
interpretations without deference . . . . State law governs contract interpretation.”);
Beghin-Say Int’l Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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duty of confidentiality. 206 Thus, federal courts interpreting the
issue may end up preempting state fiduciary or contract law
regarding the duty of confidentiality.207
An expansive definition of the Relationship Requirement
would put federal courts into the business of interpreting and
implying fiduciary duties owed by directors or executives as to
general business secrets. There is no reason to believe that a duty
of confidentiality under the DTSA is necessarily tied to state law.
Thus, the preemption implications from an expansive Relationship
Requirement are serious.208 This Article argues that general
business secrets are beyond the scope of the DTSA because they
are not sufficiently related to products or services.209 Such
information is generally governed by a combination of state
fiduciary law and state trade secret law, and a narrow interpretation
avoids preempting the state-law balance between the two.
Therefore, the anti-preemption provision makes most sense if
the system of trade secret protection is actually two-tiered (i.e., if
some trade secrets are excluded from the federal act). Exclusion of
general business information from the federal act would minimize
preemption possibilities and relegate litigation over that issue to
the state courts. Continuing to recognize the federalism values
embedded into the DTSA, the state courts are better able to balance
the law governing their corporations and general business
information—the confidentiality of which is tied closely to state
contract, tort, employment, and fiduciary law. Thus, the antipreemption
provision
clearly
suggests
a
narrow
Relationship Requirement.
Statutory context points towards a narrow Relationship
Requirement. Simply identifying a trade secret as somehow
connected or associated with a product or service is insufficient.
206

Compare Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1224–25 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (finding Pennsylvania fiduciary law provides independent duty of
confidentiality in addition to contractual provisions), with Morris Silverman Mgmt. Co.
v. W. Union Fin. Servs., 284 F. Supp. 2d 964, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (dismissing a trade
secret suit because, under Illinois law, the contract defines the extent of the duty of
confidentiality and the defendant’s conduct did not breach the contract).
207
See, e.g., Levine & Sandeen, supra note 53, at 244; Seaman, supra note 33, at 364.
208
See Seaman, supra note 33, at 359–62.
209
See generally infra Sections III.D, IV.B.
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The Relationship Requirement insists on a strong anchor tying the
trade secret to the product or service. But how close must the
relationship be? The next section explores how the EEA’s
Relationship Requirement has been interpreted.
C. Interpretation of the Term “Related to” in Prior EEA
Litigation Suggests a Narrow Interpretation
As the previous two sections discussed, the term “related to”
must be read narrowly. This, in general, comports with how courts
have construed a related phrase in the criminal theft provision of
the EEA. This Section discusses interpretation by federal district
and circuit courts of the term “related to.” 210
1. U.S. District Courts Generally Interpret “Related to”
Narrowly
The Author surveyed every district court case discussing the
term “related to” in the EEA. The survey reveals that most
prosecuted trade secrets dealt directly with the manufacture,
development, or design of a product.211 In these cases, there was no
impetus to examine whether the trade secret was sufficiently
related to the product or service.212 However, in United States v.
Hsu, a defendant challenged the term “related to” as
unconstitutionally vague. 213 The district court ruled against the
defendant, finding that, as applied, there was no vagueness because
the trade secret at issue involved a manufacturing process (i.e., was
intimately associated with the product).214
210

The context of “related to” has changed multiple times over the history of the EEA.
The phrase is currently identical to the DTSA’s term. See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832(a)
(West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (amending EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)
(2012)). But, the similarities over time are greater than the differences, and this Article
addresses the impact of changes in the language in Section III.E.
211
See, e.g., United States v. Sing, No. CR 14-212(A)-CAS, 2016 WL 54906, at *6 n.6
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016) (concerning prosecution for theft of schematics and test
procedures related to aircraft); United States v. Yihao Pu, 15 F. Supp. 3d 846, 852–53
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (concerning prosecution for stealing source code that indicated which
stocks to sell or buy); United States v. Zhang, No. CR–05–00812 RMW, 2012 WL
1932843, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) (concerning prosecution for technical and
engineering information concerning product design choices).
212
See generally cases appearing in note 211.
213
See United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627–28 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
214
Id. at 627–28.
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The void-for-vagueness argument raises a fairness issue at the
heart of interpreting the term “related to.” Read too broadly, the
term encompasses all valuable secret information, regardless of its
connection to a product or service. Yet the statute seems to
contemplate at least some connection between a product or service
and the information. Absent a direct connection between the
product or service and the information appropriated, the criminal
provision of the EEA becomes dangerously vague. This argument
weighs heavily toward defining “related to” narrowly as intimately
connected to, rather than conceivably connected to, the product or
service. Thus, under the EEA, the term “related to” generally
requires a direct relationship—such as manufacturing or design—
between the product or service and the trade secret.215
2. The Second Circuit’s Intra-Circuit Split
This Subsection discusses two cases from the Second Circuit
that wrestled with the difficulty of defining the term “related to.”
The Second Circuit is the only federal circuit court to address the
interpretation of the term “related to” in the EEA. Both cases deal
with prosecution under the criminal theft provision of the EEA,
whose Relationship Requirement at the time read: “related to or
included in a product.”216 The core of the court’s difficulty
concerns the ambiguity of the term “related to.”
United States v. Aleynikov217 and United States v. Agrawal218
provide an interesting viewpoint on the meaning of the term
“related to.” Both cases involve the same type of trade secret, yet
are decided in opposite ways by different panels less than a
year apart.
Sergey Aleynikov worked at Goldman Sachs as a computer
programmer developing source code for the company’s high215

The narrowness of the EEA is reflected in the judicial treatment of the foreign
espionage provision as well. See Robin L. Kuntz, Note, How Not to Catch a Thief: Why
the Economic Espionage Act Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 901, 914–22 (2013) (canvassing the narrowness of EEA § 1831 based on
terms not incorporated into the DTSA).
216
See Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488, 3489 (1996) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1832(a)).
217
676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012).
218
726 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2013).
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frequency trading system.219 Goldman Sachs heavily guarded the
system and never licensed it.220 In 2009, Aleynikov left Goldman
Sachs to join a Chicago-based startup looking to develop its own
high-frequency trading system.221 On his last day at work,
Aleynikov encrypted and uploaded over half a million lines of
code to a German-based server.222 Aleynikov attended a meeting
with the startup in Illinois, to which he brought portions of the
proprietary code, and was arrested when he returned to New
York.223 A jury convicted him of violating the EEA, and he
appealed that count on the theory that the source code was not
“related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed
in interstate or foreign commerce.”224
The Second Circuit reversed Aleynikov’s conviction.225 They
construed the EEA’s then-existing Nexus Requirement narrowly
and held that the statute did not reach Goldman Sachs’ trade
secret.226 Goldman Sachs had no intention of selling the system or
licensing it to anyone: “Because the [high-frequency trading]
system was not designed to enter or pass in commerce, or to make
something that does, Aleynikov’s theft of source code relating to
that system was not an offense under the EEA.”227 While the panel
decided the case on the Nexus Requirement (i.e., that the highfrequency trading platform did not flow in interstate commerce), it
also implicitly construed the term “related to” narrowly by
insisting that the trade secret “make something that [flows in
interstate commerce].”228
In Agrawal, the Second Circuit took a closer look at the
Relationship Requirement. Agrawal dealt with the same type of
trade secret (source code enabling high frequency trading),229 but
219

Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 73.
Id. at 74.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 73.
225
See id. at 82.
226
See id. at 80, 82.
227
Id. at 82.
228
See id.; see also Agrawal, 726 F.3d at 267 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (insisting that this,
indeed, is Aleynikov’s interpretation of “related to”).
229
See Agrawal, 726 F.3d at 237–38.
220
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found that the trade secret could be properly prosecuted.230 First,
the prosecutor asserted that stocks constituted the “product,” not
the source code itself. 231 Stocks are products in the flow of
interstate commerce, and thus provided the requisite nexus to
interstate commerce. (One seriously wonders how this
distinguishes the case from Aleynikov, which also involved a highfrequency trading system and the sale of stocks.) 232 Finding the
then-existing Nexus Requirement satisfied, the court followed the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term “related to” in other
statutes, 233 and construed its meaning “broad[ly].” 234 Despite
recognizing that the Supreme Court has previously cautioned that
“the term [‘related to’] must be read in context,” 235 the panel
engaged in an extraordinarily limited contextual analysis,
remarking only that the twin term “included in” encouraged a
broad definition.236
Judge Rosemary S. Pooler (who also sat on the Aleynikov
panel) vigorously dissented. Judge Pooler accused the panel of
“mischaracteriz[ing]” the facts “while simultaneous stretching
Aleynikov and disregarding the principle of stare decisis.”237 She
pointed to numerous instances indicating that the term “related to”
should be construed narrowly: Aleynikov interpreted the term
narrowly as relating to the “making” of a product; 238 “general
230

See id. at 247.
See id. at 246.
232
The court’s distinction is weak:
While Agrawal’s indictment did not state this theory in so many
words, it did allege that SocGen engaged in ‘high-frequency trading
[“HFT”] in securities’ on national markets ‘such as the New York
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Market.’ This effectively
identified securities as products traded in interstate commerce.
See id. (citation omitted).
233
See id. at 247–48.
234
Id. at 247 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)).
235
Id.
236
See id.
237
Id. at 269 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
238
Judge Pooler stated:
In Aleynikov, we gave one hint as to what might constitute ‘related
to’ when we held that ‘because the HFT system was not designed to
enter or pass in commerce, or to make something that
does, Aleynikov’s theft of source code relating to that system was not
an offense under the EEA.’ Under this interpretation, the phrase
231
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principles of statutory construction obligat[e] us to read Congress’s
statutes narrowly;”239 and both the House and Senate Reports to
the EEA provided examples of trade secrets closely related to the
manufacturing and design of products.240
Judge Pooler’s dissent in Agrawal is much more convincing on
the question of interpreting the term “related to.” For example, her
insistence that “related to” requires a close relationship, such as
“making” a product, finds clear parallel in the district court cases
examining the phrase.241 At the same time, the majority opinion
ignored the Supreme Court’s warnings to avoid simply seeking the
maximum extent of a term’s meaning in isolation.242 Furthermore,
the majority’s construction runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s
instruction to interpret terms in context.243 Their conclusory
statement that “related to” has a maximal reach is insupportable in
light of the textual and contextual evidence identified above.
Congress has amended the language of the EEA’s Nexus
Provision to its current form.244 Significantly, Congress kept the

‘related to’ is most naturally read to deal with things like a piece of
specialized machinery, which itself is not intended to enter the stream
of commerce, but which makes the product that does so.
Id. at 267 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
239
Id. at 268 (citing FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011)).
240
Such examples include:
Finally, the majority’s interpretation also offends the legislative
history of the statute which narrowly construes ‘related to.’ In both
the House and Senate Reports on the EEA, examples of trade secrets
that ‘relate to’ products included production processes, bid estimates,
production schedules, manufacturing specifications or fermentation
processes. All of these listed trade secrets bear a much closer
relationship to a product than the relationship between the securities
and the code asserted by the majority. In fact, all of these
relationships adhere to the description of ‘related to’ we gave in
Aleynikov that the trade secret ‘makes something that results in
a product.’
Id. at 268 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 6, 8–9; H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 4, 8–9)
(quoting United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original)).
241
See supra Section III.C.1.
242
See supra Section III.A.
243
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); see also supra Section III.A.
244
See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61)
(amending EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)).
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term “related to” and added the term “service.” 245 Thus, the
precedential value of Aleynikov and Agrawal is slim. However,
Pooler’s dissent clearly marshals more convincing evidence that
the term “related to” is narrow.
D. Defining “Related to”: Discerning the Direction of Trade
Secret Value
This Article proposes measuring the sufficiency of the
relationship through the direction of the trade secret’s value. The
value of a trade secret (as a matter of definition) is derived from its
secrecy, and can serve as a proxy for the strength of the anchor
connecting the trade secret to the product or service. 246 Courts
generally measure the value of the trade secret in terms of its
hypothetical value in the eyes of the competitor. 247 The DTSA
defines a trade secret as something known to one person or
company (e.g., a process, information, etc.),248 which is not
known—and actively concealed from—the public, 249 and which
“derives independent economic value” from not being known.250 It
is the strength of this independent economic value that anchors the
trade secret to the product or service.
This Section proposes the following test to determine whether
a trade secret is sufficiently related to a product or service under
the Relationship Requirement: whether, if the trade secret becomes
known to a competitor, the value of the plaintiff’s product or
service in the eyes of the competitor declines.251 If so, the value of
245

See id.
See id. § 1839(3) (amending EEA § 1839(3)); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985).
247
See, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 424 (E.D.
Va. 2004).
248
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3).
249
See id. § 1839(3)(B).
250
Id.
251
Importantly, this test is divorced from the market price of the product or service.
Exposure of a trade secret may not affect the market price of a product or service for a
host of reasons, including first-mover advantages, switching costs, brand, consumer
knowledge, transaction costs, supply-line logistics, etc. The focus is on whether the
competitor values the product or service less because it indicates that the secret is integral
to the product or service. If a competitor knows your secret ingredient, then the value of
your product is lessened. Theoretically, as the competitor replicates the secret the market
prices would converge, but the test does not require an impact on the market price.
246
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the trade secret is directed at the product or service, and therefore,
is sufficiently related to the product or service. If not, then the
value of the trade secret is not directed at, and is insufficiently
related to, the product or service. As Part IV explores, this test
operates to relegate litigation over general business information to
state courts while opening federal courts to technical trade secrets.
Two illustrations will help illuminate this test. These
illustrations are derived from the case Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc.
v. Hogan,252 which concerns a recipe for cookies. The recipe calls
for adding a “secret ingredient”—namely, walnut dust—to
cookies, which rocketed Peggy Lawton Kitchens to great
success.253 The illustration imagines two situations. The first
situation is one in which the misappropriated trade secret is the
recipe itself; the second situation imagines the misappropriated
trade secret is a strategic plan (including, inter alia, the profit
margins on the cookies and supplier contract information).
In the first situation, where the trade secret is the recipe, the
value of the trade secret is directed at the product (cookies). The
value of the secret consists of a je-ne-sais-quoi taste that is not
easily reverse-engineered, which differentiates the product from
competitors’ products. If the competitors know the secret, they can
eliminate the differentiation by including the walnut dust in their
own recipes. The value of the original cookies is therefore reduced
in the eyes of the competitors, who now know the difference.
In the second situation, where the trade secret is the strategic
plan, the value of the trade secret is not directed at the product, but
rather the strategic value of knowing a competitor’s profit margins
and suppliers. Knowledge of the secret might enable a competitor
to cut into a profit margin or steal a supplier, but it would not
affect the value of the cookie to the competitor. The competitor
must languish in ignorance of the secret ingredient. The strategic
plan doesn’t allow the competitor to produce a more competitive
cookie, because the differentiator is still secret.
The recipe would be actionable under the DTSA because it is
related to the product. The strategic plan would only be actionable
252
253

466 N.E.2d 138 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
See id. at 139.
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under state trade secret law because it is not related to the product.
This division accords with an intuition concerning the relationship
between the secrets and the product. It makes little sense to say
that the strategic plan is related to the cookie—the strategic plan is
much more related to corporate governance and company
management than it is to the cookie.
E. Alternate Views on the Relationship Requirement: A ‘Federal
Floor’ of Protection?
There are two counterarguments to a narrow interpretation of
the Relationship Requirement. The first is that the Theft of Trade
Secrets Clarification Act of 2012 (the “TTSCA”),254 passed in the
wake of Aleynikov, requires a broader interpretation of the
Relationship Requirement. The second is that a narrow
interpretation contravenes congressional intent to create a uniform
law of trade secrets, and that the DTSA was designed to create a
floor for trade secret protection, which states can augment—much
the same way that the Lanham Act does for Trademarks. This
Section examines both concerns, and rejects them.
The TTSCA purported to expand the number of trade secrets
subject to the EEA by removing the phrase “related to a product
produced for or placed in [interstate commerce],” and replacing it
with the current language “related to a product or service used in or
intended for use in [interstate commerce].” 255 For starters, the
TTSCA’s amendment of the EEA is only relevant to the extent that
the EEA’s original jurisdictional element is relevant (which is not
very). Primarily, there are significant textual and contextual
reasons to interpret the Relationship Requirement narrowly. 256
Namely, the TTSCA was a reaction to Aleynikov’s narrow reading
of the EEA’s original Nexus Requirement, not the Relationship
Requirement.257 Second, even if the TTSCA superseded and
broadened Aleynikov’s implied interpretation of the Relationship

254

Pub. L. No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627.
18 U.S.C. 1832(a) (2012) (showing language as amended by the TTSCA, sec. 2,
§ 1832(a), 126 Stat. 1627).
256
See supra Sections III.A–B.
257
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
255

2017]

THE DTSA'S FEDERALISM PROBLEM

45

Requirement, 258 the interpretation proposed here is broader than
Aleynikov. Assuming Congress intended the TTSCA to create an
opposite result in analogous cases to Aleynikov, the direction of the
value test is consistent with that intention. The high-frequency
trading platform provided an economic service to Goldman Sachs’
clients.259 The secret (the source code) derived its value from the
secrecy of the code (its efficiencies, its decision-making
parameters, etc.).260 Just like knowing about the walnut dust,
knowing the source code diminished the value of the trading
platform from the perspective of the competitors. Even if we take
the TTSCA as evidence of Congress’s intent to broaden the
jurisdictional element of the EEA, the interpretation this Article
offers suffices. Thus, the TTSCA does not require a broader
reading of the Relationship Requirement than proposed here.
The legislative history of the DTSA provides a stronger, albeit
ultimately flawed, justification for a broader interpretation of the
Relationship Requirement. Generally, the purpose of the DTSA
has been articulated as to create “uniformity” within trade secret
law. 261 On this view, the trade secret system established by the
DTSA is much the same as the trademark system established by
the Lanham Act: a floor of federal protection which states can
augment. Undoubtedly, there is appeal in a system thus construed.
However, in the words of Justice Kagan, we should “not . . .
allow[] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear
statutory language.”262
There are four principal reasons to reject this reading. First, this
reading cherry-picks the legislative history in favor of uniformity.
The price of uniformity in the trade secret system—as in the
258

See supra notes 228, 237–40 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Pooler’s
assertion that Aleynikov impliedly interpreted the relationship requirement of the EEA’s
prior jurisdictional element).
259
United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2012).
260
Id.
261
Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 4 (2016) (discussing the value of uniformity—not
available under the UTSA—to businesses seeking to protect trade secrets); S. REP. NO.
114-220, at 4 (2016) (indicating one of the key considerations of the committee was the
“impact of a uniform Federal civil remedy”). That the Act intends to encourage
uniformity is often a starting-point for criticism of the DTSA. See, e.g., Letter from
Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 6–8; Seaman, supra note 33, at 359–62.
262
Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266.
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trademark system—may in fact be preemption of state law. But the
legislative history also reveals an intention to respect state trade
secret laws.263 Congress couldn’t speak unequivocally in favor of
uniformity at the same time that it clearly spoke in favor of the
benefits of federalism. Additionally, the anti-preemption
provision 264 and clear congressional forbearance in the Nexus
Requirement 265 provide textual warnings against privileging the
“uniformity” legislative history.
Second, although an analogous system to federal trademarks
might be useful, this reading ignores the critical differences
between the Lanham Act and the DTSA. For instance, the Lanham
Act reaches all trademarks that “may lawfully be regulated by
Congress,”266 while the DTSA forbears from the full exercise of
congressional power. 267 Furthermore, the Lanham Act explicitly
displaces state trademark and unfair competition law, as far as it
conflicts in certain ways with federally registered trademarks.268
By contrast, the text of the DTSA preserves a role for the states in
the trade secret system.269
Third, there are significant normative reasons, relating to the
efficiency of innovation-networks, to favor the two-tiered system
presented here. Professor Laura Pedraza-Fariña’s recent work
suggests that trade secret law, which creates different incentives
for knowledge-workers and their managers, can slow
innovation. 270 Specifically, over-protection of “negative
263

See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 6 (“Carefully balanced to ensure an effective
and efficient remedy for trade secret owners . . . , the legislation is designed to avoid
disruption of legitimate businesses, without preempting State law.”); S. REP. NO. 114220, at 10.
264
See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61)
(amending EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)).
265
See supra Section II.E.
266
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
267
See supra Section II.E. Even discounting the obvious congressional forbearance, the
DTSA’s definition of interstate commerce is noticeably narrower than the Lanham Act’s.
See 18 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
268
See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b); see also id. § 1127; 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:4 (4th ed. 2017).
269
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (containing the anti-preemption provision).
270
See generally Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge
Networks as Innovation Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2017).
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information” 271 and overly-rigid fiduciary duties can stifle
knowledge-networks that produce innovation in hubs like Boston,
San Diego, and Silicon Valley. 272 She suggests that the optimal
trade secret system would allow states the flexibility to experiment
with different levels of protection for negative information and
fiduciary duties.273 Thus, normatively, a two-tiered system creates
better incentives than a ‘federal floor’ system by: (1) generally
excluding negative information from federal protection,274 and (2)
preserving the ability of states to vary the relationship between
trade secrets and fiduciary duties.
Fourth, there may be theoretical benefits to insisting on a twotiered system, as this Article advocates.275 The direction of value
test generally distinguishes between technical trade secrets and
business information, with technical trade secrets qualifying for
federal protection because they are sufficiently related to a product
or service. By focusing on secrets that add value to products and
services, this interpretation helps to situate trade secrets in the
panoply of federal intellectual property protection. Trade secrets
have long been odd relatives of the other intellectual property
rights, mainly because of competing theoretical justifications for
protecting secrets (including tort, contract, property, commercial
morality, and unfair competition). 276 As Professor Mark Lemley
points out, the other major intellectual property regimes have as
their focus “inventive activity” and promotion of “disclosure of
those inventions,” so that the public can benefit from the
271

“Negative information” is knowledge about what is ineffective, or what does not
work, or unfruitful research pathways, and states vary on whether such information is
protectable. See, e.g., Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 270, at 1603–04.
272
Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 270, at 1580.
273
Id. at 1605.
274
Although federal protection is likely to be highly fact-specific, it is likely that
negative information is not sufficiently related to a product or service, as its primary
benefit is to the research and development wing of a company. However, negative
information occupies a gray area in the Relationship Requirement, and specific facts may
indicate that the negative information lends extraordinary value to a product or service.
See infra Conclusion, Section B (discussing the impact of the jurisdictional element
on negative information).
275
See infra Conclusion, Section A (discussing the theoretical foundations of federal
trade secret law).
276
See, e.g., Bone, supra note 3, at 1803; Lemley, supra note 3, at 312.
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inventions.277 In other words, the other intellectual property
regimes are outcome-oriented, and seek to maximize the public
good derived in the market from inventive/creative activity. By
federalizing trade secrets that have a sufficient relationship to
market outputs (products and services), a narrow reading of the
Relationship Requirement ensures that the theory of federal trade
secret law runs in tandem to other federal intellectual property
regimes. 278 At the same time, trade secrets that are not directly
connected to the incentive for invention can be protected by the
states, each balancing protection of the information against its own
tort, contract, commercial morality, and unfair competition law.
In all, it is possible to take a broader interpretation of the
Relationship Requirement, and thus create a trade secret system
with a federal floor and state deviations. However, as discussed
above, not only does such a reading give undue priority to certain
legislative history over statutory text and ignore critical differences
between the DTSA and the Lanham Act, but it also ignores key
normative and theoretical reasons for preferring the twotiered system.
IV. TOWARD A TAXONOMY OF FEDERAL TRADE SECRETS
As the preceding Sections indicate, the Qualifying Phrase of
the DTSA narrows federally-actionable trade secrets to those trade
secrets which satisfy the Relationship and Nexus Requirements.
Other trade secrets remain protectable, if at all, only under state
law. Starting from that insight, this Part begins the task of
constructing a taxonomy for determining which trade secrets
support action under the DTSA and which do not, as summarized
in Figure 1.

277

See Lemley, supra note 3, at 329.
The Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. indicated that trade secret
law is justified in part by the incentives it creates. 416 U.S. 470, 481–82 (1974).
However, Kewanee also noted that a critical part of trade secret law was the
“maintenance of standards of commercial ethics.” Id. at 481.
278
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Figure 1
NEXUS REQUIREMENT
Column A:
Product or
service flows
in interstate
commerce

Column B:
Future flow or
slight flow
across state
lines

Column C:
Product or
service does
not cross state
lines

Row 1:
Trade secret
incorporated
into product or
service

Actionable

Likely
Actionable

Not
Actionable

Row 2:
Trade secret
directs value to
product or
service

Likely
Actionable

It Depends

Not
Actionable

Row 3:
Trade secret
directs value
elsewhere

Not
Actionable

Not
Actionable

Not
Actionable

Columns A, B, and C indicate gradations of the flow in
interstate commerce. A product or service may flow in interstate
commerce, represent de minimis or possible future flow, or may
not cross state lines at all. As discussed in Part III, the Relationship
Requirement insists upon a close relationship between the product
or service and the trade secret. Rows 1, 2, and 3 indicate how
closely the trade secret is related to a product or service. The trade
secret may be incorporated into the product or service, direct its
value towards the product or service (i.e., be used in the
manufacture of the product or service), or may direct its value
elsewhere (i.e., to the firm in general).
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This Part explores the implications of the interpretation this
Article advances. It proceeds in four sections, each of which
develops and explores hypothetical cases. These examples are
generalized and, for the purposes of this exercise, assumed to be
valid trade secrets. 279 Many—if not most—trade secrets will be
actionable under the DTSA. Most products and services, for
instance, will flow in interstate commerce in the modern economy.
Likewise, a significant chunk of past trade secret litigation
concerned “technical trade secrets”—i.e., trade secrets most likely
to be incorporated in or direct value toward a product or service.280
Furthermore, highly valuable trade secrets likely to be litigated will
also likely be actionable. For instance, a recipe for a popular cola
beverage281 or a recipe for breading fried chicken282 obviously both
(1) provide direct value to a product, and (2) the product actually
flows in interstate commerce. Through examining hypotheticals
one can begin to develop a sense for the dividing lines and edge
cases which will develop as the DTSA’s jurisdictional element
is interpreted.
However, protection for some trade secrets will be relegated to
state law. The following three sections discuss the dividing line
between protection under the DTSA and recourse under state law.
It is important to keep in mind that not being actionable under the
279

The exact contours of a federal trade secret have not been developed. However, it is
assumed that at a high level of generality: (1) the trade secret must be secret (i.e., “not . . .
generally known . . . [or] readily ascertainable”); (2) the trade secret must derive
independent economic value from its secrecy; and (3) the owner must have taken
reasonable precautions to maintain secrecy. See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (defining “trade secret”). More specifically, this
Article assumes that all the examples below generate discernable value from
their secrecy.
280
Prior research demonstrates that between fifty-and-sixty percent of trade secrets
litigated in federal court (in diversity) are “technical” (i.e., formulas, technical
information, or computer programs). See Almeling et al., Federal Study, supra note 44, at
304–05. In state courts, only a third of cases litigated technical trade secrets. See
Almeling et al., State Study, supra note 44, at 60, 72–73.
281
For instance, Coca-Cola’s formula. See Lionel Laurent, The Price of Coke’s Secrets,
FORBES (May 23, 2007), https://www.forbes.com/2007/05/23/joya-williams-coke-facemarkets-cx_ll_0523autofacescan05.html#a85d0174102e [https://perma.cc/NV37-46M8].
282
For instance, KFC’s secret blend of herbs and spices. See Liam Stack, Is This the
Top-Secret KFC Recipe?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08
/26/dining/is-this-the-top-secret-kfc-recipe.html [https://perma.cc/PTG3-U5DY].
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DTSA does not prevent recovery for misappropriation. Rather, it
simply requires that those trade secrets are governed by state trade
secret law.
First, Section IV.A discusses the narrowing effect of the Nexus
Requirement. The Nexus Requirement places a barrier between a
plaintiff and suit based upon the movement of the product or
service in interstate commerce. 283 However, although the Nexus
Requirement is narrower than similar “affecting commerce”
language, it is not much narrower. Thus, in the interconnected
modern internet economy, most trade secrets will satisfy the Nexus
Requirement. The exceptions, though, are worth contemplating.
Section IV.B then discusses the narrowing effect of the
Relationship Requirement. This Article argues that a principled
test for properly narrowing the Relationship Requirement finds that
trade secrets are “related to” a product or service under the DTSA,
so long as the value of the trade secret is directed at the product
or service.284
A. DTSA Step One: Defining Interstate Trade Secrets Under the
Nexus Requirement
The Nexus Requirement limits the DTSA to products and
services that flow in interstate commerce. Simply affecting
interstate commerce is not sufficient; the product or service must
actually cross state lines. There are certain products or services that
are entirely local and will fail to satisfy the Nexus Requirement.
However, there are also difficult cases—involving de minimis and
potential interstate flow—that are discussed below.
1. Failing the Nexus Requirement
Some trade secrets will fail the Nexus Requirement. Take the
following two hypotheticals under consideration.
*****

283
284

See supra Section II.E.
See supra Section III.D.
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Hypothetical: CleanRite. 285 CleanRite is a privately-owned
janitorial service based in Los Angeles with approximately seven
percent of the Los Angeles janitorial market, but has no clients
outside of Los Angeles County. A vast majority of its janitors are
hired from within the county, and almost all of its supplies are
purchased from within California. The company does not solicit
clients out of state, and its only out-of-state business calls and mail
are sent to the Internal Revenue Service. CleanRite has rapidly
expanded because its founder conceived a work-flow process
which allows its janitors to work at almost twice the speed of
comparable janitors with only half the training. CleanRite’s Chief
Financial Officer quits, taking the details of this process with her to
CleanRite’s chief competitor: Cleaners4Less.
Hypothetical: The Warren Buffet. 286 The Warren Buffet is a
small buffet restaurant located in Nebraska. The Warren Buffet’s
gimmick is that diners are provided complete privacy because of
the hermetic nature of the booths. The buffet does not deliver,
although it does source some of its ingredients from out of state.
The owner, Fiver Rabbit, developed a process which allows him to
only cook once a week yet provide fresh-tasting food. The process
includes modified recipes, flash-freezing, special re-warming
techniques, and lotus leaves. A rival buffet, astonished at the
Warren Buffet’s ability to reduce chef labor costs, sent a spy to
learn the secret. After months of working as a server and gaining
Fiver’s trust, the spy succeeded in obtaining the secret. The rival
buffet begins practicing the trade secret.
*****
In the hypotheticals above, neither CleanRite nor the Warren
Buffet actually uses their products or services in interstate
commerce. The janitorial service is provided exclusively in
California, and Warren Buffet does not serve meals outside
Nebraska. Thus, their products and services do not flow in
interstate
commerce,
and
they
cannot
meet
the
Nexus Requirement.
285

The facts of this hypothetical impute a trade secret into the facts of United States v.
American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271, 273–75 (1975).
286
The facts of this hypothetical are based loosely on Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d
965, 966–67 (9th Cir. 1996).
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The first thing to note about the above hypotheticals is exactly
how far one must constrain the activities of the company to fail the
Nexus Requirement. Because the product or service itself must
flow in interstate commerce, one need not go as far as the
hypotheticals above. The limited extent to which it can be said to
“affect” interstate commerce is insufficient. CleanRite might be
able to hire its janitors from out of state, so long as the janitorial
service does not cross state lines. Likewise, the Warren Buffet
might be able to have out-of-state customers and procure out-ofstate ingredients, so long as it does not deliver or franchise out
of state.
Regardless, this exercise makes clear the Nexus Requirement’s
low bar. Given the realities of modern commerce, very few
products and only slightly more services will be truly intrastate;
for example, recipes for local dishes. However, one can imagine
relatively large businesses that do not offer their services—at
least—in interstate commerce. Janitorial services are one; others
might include gardening, roofing, construction, and other laborintensive services. If the defendant can prove that the plaintiff is
wholly involved in intrastate commerce, the Nexus Requirement
cannot be satisfied.
2. The Dividing Line: When Does an Intrastate Product or
Service Become Interstate?
The following two hypotheticals test the boundary of the
Nexus Requirement. The first hypothetical speaks directly to the
point at which one can consider a product or service to be “used
in” interstate commerce. Specifically, the question arises whether
de minimis movement in interstate commerce satisfies the Nexus
Requirement. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board recently
found that de minimis sale (of two hats) in interstate commerce
failed the Lanham Act’s definition of “in commerce.”287 But the
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Lanham Act’s definition
of “commerce”—“all commerce which may lawfully be regulated
by Congress”288—reached the full extent of Congress’s commerce
287

See Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 987–88 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (discussing the basis of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s decision).
288
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
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clause power, and therefore captured even de minimis movement
in commerce.289 Because the Nexus Requirement does not reach
the full extent of Congress’s power,290 one must query whether de
minimis
interstate
connection
qualifies
under
the
Nexus Requirement.
The second hypothetical raises the question of the extent to
which a product or service is “intended for use in”
interstate commerce.
*****
Hypothetical: Goodbye, Partner. 291 Les Poplar and Andy
Aspen founded Aspen & Poplar, LLP after graduating from law
school. Both Poplar and Aspen are licensed to practice law only in
California and ninety percent of their business is in California state
court (the other ten percent is in the federal district courts of
California on diversity cases). The two attorneys rarely practice
law outside of the state of California, although some of their clients
are domiciled in states other than California. They rarely appear in
court outside of California. In only a few cases has either of the
two partners maintained a diversity action outside the state to argue
that the case should be transferred to or remain in California. For a
variety of reasons, Aspen decided to part ways with Poplar, and
they dissolved their partnership amicably. Shortly after dissolving
their partnership, Poplar learned that many of his top clients have
been secreted away by Aspen, despite his understanding that their
dissolution agreement left all the clients to him. Poplar brings a
suit under the DTSA to protect his client lists.
Hypothetical: New England Roofers, Inc.292 Terry Roo and Ben
Fers founded Terry & Ben Roofers in Boston in 1990. The
company has enjoyed commercial success because in 1989 they
invented a roofing tar that lasts twenty percent longer than their
289

See Christian Faith Fellowship, 841 F.3d at 990–94.
See supra Section II.E.
291
The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based upon Complaint at 3–5, Mahamedi v.
Paradice, No. 16-cv-02805 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016). Poplar’s case also fails because
the trade secret (a client list) is not sufficiently related to the service. See infra
Section IV.B.
292
The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based upon the facts of Morlife, Inc. v.
Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
290
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competitors’ roofing tar. They discovered the formula while
experimenting with an expired patent and found that adding
brewed English tea to the tar greatly improved the tar’s longevity.
The pair opted for trade secret protection, rather than seeking to
patent their invention. In 2015, as part of an expansionary business
plan, they reincorporated under the name New England Roofers,
Inc. The 2015 business plan called for a five-year effort to expand
their business into Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New
Hampshire. The plan included aggressive marketing in the target
states, attendance at out-of-state networking events, mass mailers,
and cold calls to prospective clients. Although their strategic plan
is going well, they have not yet landed an out-of-state client. Their
Marketing Director, Brad Guy (who has never mixed tar in his
life), recently downloaded the secret tar recipe from a confidential
server, quit his job, and has been hired by New England Roofer’s
primary competitor as “Chief Tar Director.”
*****
The challenge in both hypotheticals is the tension between
formalism and functionalism: exactly how “interstate” can a
product or service be before it satisfies the Nexus Requirement?
Viewing the Nexus Requirement functionally has the advantage of
preserving federalism interests and engendering a robust reading of
the anti-preemption provision of the DTSA. Formalism presents a
cleaner, if under-inclusive, rule.
Poplar’s hypothetical presents the federalism issue directly.
Poplar is licensed to practice law only in California and his
practice is largely confined to California. The partnership was a
California partnership, governed by California fiduciary law. The
only provision of Poplar’s legal services that were rendered out of
state included services designed to keep his practice of law within
the state of California or included services ancillary to the practice
of law in California (such as taking depositions). Yet the formalist
would point out that he provides his service across state lines. A
rule that allows de minimis interstate movement to satisfy the
Nexus Requirement endangers federalizing, in this instance, state
partnership law. The conflict is essentially one between two
California citizens concerning dissolution of a California
partnership that rendered services almost entirely in California.
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The fiduciary duty owned by Aspen to Poplar—along with the
question of whether the particular client lists even qualify as
property of the partnership—appears to be best suited for
resolution by California state law in California state courts. Thus,
the question arises whether federalism interests outweigh de
minimis interstate movement of Poplar’s services. For those who
take federalism and the anti-preemption section of the DTSA
seriously, perhaps the Nexus Requirement should tolerate a small
degree of interstate commerce.
The New England Roofer’s hypothetical poses a different
quandary: how to deal with a professed intent to engage in
interstate commerce. The Nexus Requirement includes the
language “used in, or intended for use in, interstate . . .
commerce.”293 The intent language poses a problem. On the one
hand, “intended for use” may point to the subjective intent of the
trade secret owner. On this reading, the query turns to the indicia
of that intent: How concrete must the intent be? Must the
opportunity to engage in interstate commerce be realistic? What
factors help the court discern whether an intention is professed to
take advantage of the federal act or whether an intention is sincere?
For the New England Roofer’s, this subjective intent is likely met.
Terry and Ben obviously intend for their service to flow in
interstate commerce: the ambition has been memorialized in a
business plan; they have engaged in extensive marketing; and they
are actively soliciting out-of-state clients. However, if one squints,
it may be hard to distinguish this case from that of Poplar because
there is no service in the flow of interstate commerce, and there are
no out-of-state clients. Certainly, the rule cannot be so flexible to
allow Poplar simply to plead intent to practice law out of state, and
gain protection for what has heretofore been an asset of a
California partnership.
On the other hand, perhaps the language “or intended for use
in” interstate commerce is meant to reinforce the breadth of
congressional power asserted. Congressional authority does not
only exist at state lines, but also crosses into the interior of states to
293

DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61)
(emphasis added).

2017]

THE DTSA'S FEDERALISM PROBLEM

57

reach items in the flow of interstate commerce before they reach
state lines, or after they cross state lines, but before they reach their
destination. 294 Perhaps the “intend for” language reinforces
Congress’s intent to capture products and services prepared for
interstate commerce which have not yet flowed across a state line.
This assessment of “intended for use” would require proof that a
product or service is in interstate commerce but simply hasn’t
reached another state yet. Under this reading, Terry and Fred’s
subjective intent to engage in interstate commerce might not
provide their trade secrets federal protection until they have
actually obtained a client in another state. Between the formation
of their subjective intent and the retention of an out-of-state client,
the Nexus Requirement may not be satisfied. However, between
the retention of the out-of-state client and provision of services to
that client, the services are sufficiently intended to be in the flow
of interstate commerce.
Although this reading might seem harsh or the timing of
protection might seem arbitrary, it implicates the same federalism
interests as the de minimis flow in interstate commerce. Up until
the intention becomes imminent and realistic, Jerry and Fred’s
trade secret is an asset of a Massachusetts corporation that has
never left the state: it seems ripe for resolution by Massachusetts
law rather than federal law. Furthermore, requiring objective
indicia of interstate flow of a good or service serves the judicial
economy. Subjective intention can be fabricated to gain access to
federal protection. Hence, leaving the state law cases to the state
courts in the first instance is preferable.
3. Nexus Requirement Summary
Our hypotheticals teach two important lessons. First, a service
is more likely to be exclusively local than a product: a service can
be more easily confined to a geographic location, while most
products in the age of the Internet flow across state lines. Simply,
trade secrets that relate to products are more likely to satisfy the
Nexus Requirement. Of course, products that are limited to
intrastate commerce for legal or regulatory reasons, almost by
294

See, e.g., McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 648–54 (1982).
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definition, cannot satisfy the requirement because they are entirely
intrastate. On a broad reading of the provision (one that maximizes
the number of trade secrets given federal protection), only those
products or services that absolutely do not flow in interstate
commerce would fail the Nexus Requirement. In the examples
above, only CleanRite would fail to satisfy the requirement. On a
slightly narrower reading of the provision—which affords fewer
trade secrets federal protection—hyper local products such as craft
beer and meals in restaurants might not qualify for protection, so
long as they are not sold across state lines (for example, the
Warren Buffet). This slightly narrower reading might allow
interstate provision of raw ingredients, if the final product did not
flow in interstate commerce. But it does open the door to the
question: How much interstate flow will the Nexus
Requirement tolerate?
The answer is the second lesson: the breadth or narrowness of
Nexus Provision will depend upon the weight given to federalism
and anti-preemption concerns. As seen in the Goodbye Partner
hypothetical,295 a tolerance for slight interstate flow of a product or
service may serve federalism’s values by relegating to state courts
interaction between state trade secret law and state partnership or
fiduciary law. Trade secrets are intimately connected with other
areas of state public policy, including fiduciary duties, contract,
and employment mobility. The removal of some of these cases to
federal court presents challenges to state systems that have struck
separate balances between the protection of trade secrets and other
public policies—most notably, California’s balance between
employee mobility and trade secret protection in its rejection of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. 296 Respecting these state-law
balances requires relegating certain causes to state courts for
determination. 297 In Poplar’s case, for instance, the question of
whether the client list qualifies as a trade secret is a question of
295

See supra Section IV.A.2.
See FLIR Sys. v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1277 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)
(rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine as contrary to CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 16600 (West, Westlaw through ch. 859 of 2017 Reg. Sess.)).
297
Legislative history, for what it is worth, suggests that Congress intended to respect
the balances struck between trade secret and other state law. H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 14
(2016); S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016).
296
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California trade secret law. And, if the client list does not qualify
as property of the partnership, then it would be difficult to argue
that Aspen failed his fiduciary duties to hold “property” of the
partnership in trust,298 or that he failed a fiduciary duty to avoid a
“knowing violation of the law” in winding up the partnership.299
But, the federal court is not required to follow California’s
determination about whether a client list qualifies as a trade secret
if the DTSA authorizes federal courts to define a federal trade
secret. Thus, California law and federal law may give the same
information different status as property; a result that might upset
California’s balance between state fiduciary and trade secret law.
To the extent society wants to preserve a role for primarily local
trade secrets to be governed by state law and not pre-empted by
federal common law, society should tolerate de minimis interstate
movement of goods and services.
B. The DTSA Step Two: The Relationship Requirement
Determining whether a trade secret’s value is directed at a
product or service is a highly-fact specific inquiry. To explore the
test developed in this Article, this Section analyzes hypotheticals
where the value of the trade secret is directed (and is not directed)
at a product or service. The result demonstrates how trade secrets
incorporated into products or services and technical trade secrets
are clearly actionable under the DTSA. General business
information, however, likely will not qualify.
1. Satisfying the Relationship Requirement
This Section explores how the direction of the value delineates
the relationship between the trade secret and the product or service.
*****
Hypothetical: Mrs. Dolly, Co.300 Margery Dolly designs dolls.
She has decades of experience in the doll industry tracking trends
298
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 859 of 2017
Reg. Sess.).
299
Id. § 16404(c).
300
This hypothetical is based loosely on an Order granting in part and denying in-part
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Shapiro v. Hasbro Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02964BRO (AJWx), 2016 WL 9176559 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016).

60

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:1

and developing designs. She’s an independent contractor who has
worked with the biggest doll manufacturers. Her company, Mrs.
Dolly, Co., is highly sought after as a market consultant in the doll
industry. In the doll industry, the first-mover advantage of a good
product guarantees market dominance. Dolly had a meeting with
the doll-manufacturing company Little Princess, in which she
pitched a centaur-like doll targeted at young boys. The pitch and
the doll design were based on her assessment of the doll market.
She provided Little Princess with a mock-up of the doll, and a
PowerPoint presentation explaining how to market and price the
doll, in order to take advantage of the current hole in the market.
The PowerPoint presentation included market research, concept,
pricing, focus group research, and trend analyses. Little Princess
declined to move forward with Dolly. However, within months (in
general accord with Dolly’s marketing advice) Little Princess
released a nearly identical doll at the price point revealed by Dolly.
Hypothetical: GrainMax. 301 GrainMax is a large corporation
that provides a range of products and services to farmers in the
United States and across the world. One of GrainMax’s products is
a digital tool that helps farmers know when, where, and in what
quantity to plant crops to attain a specified yield. The company
keeps this digital tool updated by utilizing a variety of algorithms
and collections of information about the efficiency of the tools.
One of GrainMax’s employees used his computer to download
parts of the algorithms and representative samples of information.
This employee has been hired by GrainMax’s primary competitor.
*****
Both examples fall within the Relationship Requirement. Mrs.
Dolly’s market analysis, know-how, focus-group results, and
mock-ups are integral to the design of the final doll product. Mrs.
Dolly clears the Relationship Requirement regardless of whether
one considers the product (a doll) or the service (her consulting).
The value of the trade secret comes from a combination of firstmover advantage, branding, and unique market research. The
301

This hypothetical is based loosely on Complaint at 2–5, Monsanto Co. v. Chen, No.
4:16-cv-876 (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2016), dismissed in part, No. 4:16-cv-00876-CDP (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 22, 2016), and injunction granted in part, No. 4:16-cv-00876-CDP (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 23, 2016).
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competitor doll manufacturer would value the doll less if this
information is generally known because it would be able to steal
the first-mover advantage, brand, or research insights. A
competitor consultant would value this information because it
would lower the distinctive quality of Mrs. Dolly’s
consulting service.
The GrainMax example works in roughly the same manner.
The digital tool is a product. The algorithm and information, if
they become generally known, lower the value of the digital tool in
the eyes of GrainMax’s competitors, who now can better
approximate the accuracy of the tool. The algorithm and
information are related to the digital tool sufficiently to satisfy the
Relationship Requirement. While what was taken was only partial,
it necessarily impacts the intrinsic value of the digital tool (and
continued subscription to it). Thus, while it may not be directly
connected to the design or working of the digital tool itself, the
trade secret information satisfies the Relationship Requirement.
2. Failing the Relationship Requirement
The following hypotheticals indicate how the direction of a
trade secret’s value may indicate that a trade secret fails the
Relationship Requirement.
*****
302

Hypothetical: Halifax. Halifax is a consulting company that
provides services to public and private entities across the country.
Halifax helps companies develop business rules. The President,
CEO, and sole-shareholder of Halifax, Mary Halifax, has decided
to sell her company. To that end, she and one of her employees
developed a “valuation packet.” This valuation packet includes
customer-specific price points for Halifax services, end-dates of
contracts, contract terms, and contact information. It also includes
sensitive financial data and future strategies for the business. The
employee who helped develop the valuation packet, Martin Treble,
absconded with the valuation packet. He has set up meetings,
claiming to be an owner of Halifax, with companies seeking to
302

This hypothetical is based loosely on Complaint, Truepenny People LLC v. Cota,
No. 3:16-cv-00424-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2016).
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acquire Halifax. Halifax alleges that the valuation packet is the
trade secret.
Hypothetical: BetterScore.303 BetterScore monitors consumer’s
use of credit and provides identity protection and credit monitoring
products. BetterScore has spent millions of dollars developing a
web platform from which consumers can access their credit scores
online. Because of the enormity of the project, BetterScore hired
another company to manage development of the source code for its
web platform. Terrance Lions was this company’s project manager
for the BetterScore web platform. After significant work, Lions
posted the code in a public location online, from which others
could download the web platform and use for their own purposes.
*****
The Relationship Requirement first requires that the plaintiff
identify the product or service and then identify the trade secret.304
For Halifax, the service is their consulting services; the trade secret
is the valuation packet. For BetterScore, the products and services
derive from their credit monitoring and identify protection; the
trade secret is the source code for the web platform. Once
identified, the analysis turns to whether the value of identified
trade secret is directed at the identified product or service.
For both Halifax and BetterScore, there is insufficient
proximity to satisfy the Relationship Requirement. Take Halifax
first. The valuation packet has a value in its secrecy. The packet
heavily informs Halifax’s minimum sale value. In negotiations
with potential acquirers, the valuation packet informs the positions
taken by Halifax and may represent the best alternative to sale.
Although it includes significant information about the services
provided (price points and profit margins, for instance), the value
of the secret is not directed at those services. If the information
were to become public, competitors of Halifax would know the
profit margin of the services, but not how to provide more
competitive services. Thus, the revelation would not affect the
valuation of Halifax services by its competitors. The value of the
303

This hypothetical is based loosely on Complaint, Consumerinfo.com, Inc. v. Leon,
No. 8:16-cv-01261-DOC-KES (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016).
304
See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61).
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secret is not targeted at the service, but rather at the company (i.e.,
the value of the company).
BetterScore’s situation is similar. The web platform provides
value to BetterScore. The back-end of a website represents a
considerable investment, and the website may make access to the
products and services easier. The web platform could be a valuable
asset of BetterScore, perhaps even differentiating it as a company
from its competitors enough to justify a higher market price for its
product. However, the web platform does not change the value to
ScoreWatch’s competitors of the products and services it supplies
(i.e., its credit monitoring and identity protection). Instead, it
simply makes the display of these items easier and more accessible
to customers. A display case does not increase the intrinsic value
of the diamond it houses. Revelation of the back-end of the website
does not lower the value to BetterScore’s competitors of the
products and services it provides.
Thus, neither the valuation packet nor the web platform is
sufficiently related to the products or services to satisfy the
Relationship Requirement. This result fits well with intuition. For
instance, one might be able to articulate how the valuation packet
or website are “related to” the products and services involved.
However, they seem to be more related to other aspects of the
business. Thus, a valuation packet may include information about
a product or service, but it seems more related to the sale of the
business than to the specific product or service. Furthermore, a
website may display information about a product or service, but it
seems to be better categorized—alongside the product or service—
as an independent asset of the corporation. For instance, the
website may be just as valuable displaying a different product. It
therefore seems more related to the business than it does to
any product.
3. Relationship Requirement Summary
As the hypotheticals above indicate, the Relationship
Requirement generally tends to favor technical trade secrets rather
than general business information. The distinction between these
two types of trade secrets is too crude to be helpful as a general
matter. For instance, it will be insufficient to label a strategic plan
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“general business information” and exclude it from protection
under the DTSA. The strategic plan could have specific
information on it, such as a formula or a manufacturing process,
which is deserving of protection. However, in such a situation it is
important to note that it is not the strategic plan which receives
protection, but the information contained within it. However, at a
general level, the distinction helps to visualize the impact of the
Relationship Requirement: it protects technical trade secrets and
leaves general business information to state courts.
CONCLUSION
The DTSA did not federalize all trade secrets. Parts II and III
of this Article provided a principled basis for concluding that the
jurisdictional nexus of the DTSA narrows application of the statute
to trade secrets which direct their value to a product or service that
actually flows in interstate commerce. As the Article explored in
Part IV, the jurisdictional nexus operates to exclude some trade
secrets—namely trade secrets regarding general business
information—while protecting other trade secrets—namely
technical trade secrets. These are the two primary contributions of
this Article to the literature: the DTSA has a narrow jurisdictional
element which generally federalizes technical trade secrets, while
leaving general business information to state regulation.
This conclusion explores the theoretical implications of the
DTSA’s jurisdictional hook. In short, there are two: the theoretical
foundations of federal trade secret law, and developing differences
between state and federal trade secret law. A quick overview of
these implications rounds out the Article and highlights the stakes
presented by this Article’s interpretation of the Qualifying Phrase.
A. The Theoretical Foundations of Federal Trade Secret Law
The jurisdictional element brings federal trade secret theory
more into line with other federal intellectual property theories.
Traditionally, state trade secret law has suffered from crisis of
theoretical foundation.305 The basic problem with state trade secret
305

See, e.g., Bone, supra note 3, at 1803–10.
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theory has been whether to justify the cause of action as a tort
right, a contract right, or a property right. It has elements of all
three, as well as complex elements of commercial morality
interspersed with employment law. Viewing trade secret as
intellectual property can solve many of these problems, 306 but
sometimes unsatisfactorily and not entirely. 307 But, federal trade
secret law may not suffer the same theoretical deficiencies because
it insists on a proximate connection between the trade secret and a
product or service.308 That connection aligns federal trade secret
theory with the incentive-and-disclosure regime commonly thought
to motivate patent and copyright. Federal trade secret law provides
incentives toward inventive activity through protecting useful
(read: valuable) trade secrets from the perspective of increasing the
provision of products and services. Of course, “disclosure” sits
uncomfortably with “secrets.” But by protecting those trade secrets
integral to products and services, federal trade secret law
encourages greater production of those products and services (and
thus greater use of the valuable knowledge).309 Of course, elements
of contract and commercial morality—inherently present in the
DTSA’s definition of “misappropriation”310—complicate this
theoretical landscape.311 But, the focus on economic output (goods
and services) puts federal trade secret law much more in line with
traditional federal intellectual property justifications.
B. The DTSA Is Not a Federal “Version” of State Trade
Secret Law
The jurisdictional element makes it impossible to view the
DTSA simply as a federal “version” of state trade secret law. The
two are different beasts. The jurisdictional element will have
theoretical impact on other aspects of trade secret law over and
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See supra notes 270–78 and accompanying text.
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See DTSA § 1839(5) (showing how misappropriation includes, inter alia, violation
of un-defined “duties” and “improper means”—both of which include elements of
contract and commercial morality).
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Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–82 (1974) (grounding trade secret protection in both
maintenance of corporate morality and inventive incentives).
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above excluding or including trade secrets. Two simple examples
will demonstrate this, and both deal with the definition of “trade
secret.” 312 First is “negative information,” which is information
concerning ineffective uses or research dead ends.313 Protection of
negative information varies state to state,314 and federal protection
is not clear. Although negative information can definitively have
value, information about what not to do is likely not sufficiently
connected to a product or service.315 Thus, the definition of “trade
secret” has to be read through the lens of whether that trade secret
qualifies for protection under the DTSA.
The second example is more consequential: “continuous use.”
Originally, trade secrets had to be in continuous use before they
were protectable. 316 However, the Uniform Trade Secret Act of
1985 rejected the continuous use requirement,317 and most states
have followed along.318 The jurisdictional element of the DTSA on
the other hand, seems to clearly contemplate actual use of the trade
secret. By requiring an actual link to a product or service, and by
requiring that product or service to be actually flowing in
commerce, the DTSA excludes from federal protection unused
trade secrets. Thus, simple development and ownership of a trade
secret—without any actualization—is not sufficient to qualify for
312
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prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored,
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if—
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protection under the DTSA. This is a significant deviation from
state law.
These two examples underscore the importance of the
jurisdictional element in constructing a two-tier system of trade
secret protection. But, more importantly, the jurisdictional element
establishes an independent system of trade secret protection. More
examples will be forthcoming as the DTSA matures, but at the
outset it is important to note how the DTSA as a whole must be
read through the prism of the jurisdictional element, requiring first
a proximate connection between the trade secret and a product or
service, and second, the actual flow of that product or service in
interstate commerce.

